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ARTICLES
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR
COMMERCIAL LOSS: AN ALTERNATIVE
TO HADLEY v. BAXENDALE
THOMAS A. DIAMOND*
HOWARD FOSS**
INTRODUCTION

Described as "a fixed star in the jurisprudential firmament,"' the

English case of Hadley v. Baxendale2 has been recognized in
American jurisprudence as the definitive source for determining when
consequential damages may be recovered for breach of contract. 3 Yet
* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. B.S. 1962, University of Pennsylvania;
L.L.B. 1965, University of California, Los Angeles; LL.M. 1966, New York University
School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. A.B. 1968, Harvard College; J.D.
1973, University of California at Berkeley.
The authors thank their colleague David Welkowitz for his helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article.
1. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 83 (1974).
2. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
3. The decision is cited with approval by the highest court of 43 states. See Native
Alaskan Reclamation & Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank Alaska, 685 P.2d 1211,
1218-19 (Alaska 1984); Higgins v. Arizona Say. & Loan Ass'n., 365 P.2d 476, 482-83
(Ariz. 1961); Carroll v. Jones, 373 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Ark. 1963); Hunt Bros. Co. v. San
Lorenzo Water Co., 87 P. 1093, 1095 (Cal. 1906); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Trinidad
Bean & Elevator Co., 267 P. 1068, 1069 (Colo. 1928); General Motors Corp. v. Martine, 567 A.2d 808, 811 (Conn. 1989); National Airlines, Inc. v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d
545, 547 (Fla. 1976); Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 839 P.2d 10, 29
n.11 (Haw. 1992); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1022 (Idaho 1986);
Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 515 N.E.2d 61, 67 (Ill. 1987);
Pirchio v. Noecker, 82 N.E.2d 838, 840 (Ind. 1948); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911,
920 (Iowa 1976); Enlow v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 P.2d 617, 623 (Kan. 1991);
Borden, Inc. v. Howard Trucking Co., 454 So. 2d 1081, 1098 (La. 1983); Dodge v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n., 417 A.2d 969, 975 (Me. 1980); Stone v. Chicago Title Ins.
Co., 624 A.2d 496, 501 (Md. 1993); Abrams v. Reynolds Metals Co., 166 N.E.2d 204,
207 (Mass. 1960); Stockdae v. Jamison, 330 N.W.2d 389,392 (Mich. 1982); Lesmeister
v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 103 (Minn. 1983); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Day, 487 So.
2d 830, 835 (Miss. 1986); Spruce Co. v. Mays, 62 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Mo. 1933); Laas v.
Montana State Highway Comm'n, 483 P.2d 699, 704 (Mont. 1971); Birkel v. Hassebrook Farm Serv., Inc., 363 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Neb. 1985); Charlie Brown Constr.
Co. v. City of Boulder, 797 P.2d 946, 952 (Nev. 1990); Hydraform Prods. Corp. v.
American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339, 345 (N.H. 1985); Perini Corp. v.
Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 373 (NJ. 1992); Torrance County
Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health & Env't Dept., 830 P.2d 145, 154
(N.M. 1992); Goodstein Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 604 N.E.2d 1356, 1361
(N.Y. 1992); Pipkin v. Thomas & Hill, Inc., 258 S.E.2d 778, 783 (N.C. 1979); Glatt v.
Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 383 N.W.2d 473, 484 (N.D. 1986); Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp., 106 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ohio 1952); Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184, 190 n.1
(Okla. 1987); Welch v. United States Bancorp Realty & Mortgage Trust, 596 P.2d 947,
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despite its widespread and enduring acceptance, the case remains the

subject of ongoing scholarly debate, and its underlying policies and
precise meaning remain elusive. This Article re-examines when consequential damages for commercial loss should be recovered and begins by identifying and evaluating the relevant policies. Following the
policy evaluations, the authors conclude that the application of a single, inflexible standard for liability, irrespective of the surrounding circumstances, is a fundamentally flawed approach. It is the authors'
position that different contractual situations reflect different policy
concerns necessitating different levels of liability. The authors propose, as an alternative to Hadley, a trifurcated standard that varies the

scope of liability according to the situation.
I.

THE CASE OF HADLEY V. BAXENDALE AND ITS EVOLUTION

A. Summary of the Case
In Hadley, a mill was shut down while the millers sought to replace
a broken shaft. Lacking a spare, and needing to send the broken shaft
to the manufacturer as the model for a new one, the millers hired
defendant carrier to transport the broken shaft.' The carrier, however, was unaware that the millers had no spare and that they could
not operate the mill until a new shaft was delivered. 6 The transport of
the broken shaft was delayed through the neglect of the carrier, result963 (Or. 1979); Robinson Protective Alarm Co. v. Bolger & Picker, 516 A.2d 299, 303
n.9 (Pa. 1986); Quill Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 477 A.2d 939, 943 (R.I. 1984); Drews Co.
v. Ledwith-Wolfe Assocs., 371 S.E.2d 532, 535 (S.C. 1988); TIrner v. Benson, 672
S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn. 1984); Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.
1981); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985); Albright v. Fish, 422
A.2d 250, 254 (Vt. 1980); Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n. v. Doyle & Russell, Inc., 214 S.E.2d
155, 160 (Va. 1975); Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants, 815 P.2d 1362, 1373 (Wash.
1991); Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Sellaro, 214 S.E.2d 823, 827 (W. Va. 1975).
The rule of Hadley is accepted by the highest court of three states, but not by name.
See Smalley Transp. Co. v. Bay Dray, Inc., 612 So. 2d 1182, 1189 (Ala. 1992); Mash v.
Cutler, 488 N.W.2d 642, 651 (S.D. 1992); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 11 (Wyo.
1980).
In the remaining four states, appellate decisions have referred to and accepted
Hadley. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. C.F. Schwartz Motor Co., 251 A.2d 353, 355
(Del. Super. Ct. 1969); Smith v. A.A. Wood & Son Co., 120 S.E.2d 800, 804-05 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1961); Overstreet v. Greenwell, 441 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969);
Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 405 N.W.2d 354, 383 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
4. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 101-18 (1989) (defending Hadley as a "penalty default" rule whose limitations upon liability serve to promote economic efficiency); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principleof Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 Cal.
L. Rev. 563, 602-04 (1992) (condemning Hadley for undermining the policy goals of
deterring breach and of compensating the victim of breach); Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of ContractDefault Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615,
615-39 (1990) (condemning Hadley for failing to promote efficiency).
5. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. at 341, 156 Eng. Rep. at 145-46.
6. Id. at 355-56, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
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ing in breach of contract and the millers' extended loss of profits from
the continued shutdown of their operations.'
The rule for recovery of contract damages was framed by the Hadley court as follows:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to
the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances
under which the contract was actually made were communicated by
the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the
damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they
would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury
which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these
special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the
other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to
the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which
would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected b , any special circumstances, from such a breach of
contract.v
The court found that the millers' inability to operate until the shaft
was returned constituted special circumstances. ' Because these special circumstances were not communicated to the carrier, the millers
were not entitled to their lost profits. The court explained that "in the
great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts to third
persons by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such consequences
would not, in all probability, have occurred."'1 The case altered prior
law, which did not impose significant restrictions on the recovery of
damages for breach of contract."
Hadley has been interpreted to create two rules for the recovery of
damages for breach of contract, the first for general damages and the
second for consequential damages. 2 General damages are market7. Id. at 341, 156 Eng. Rep. at 146.
8. Id. at 354-55, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.

9. Id. at 356, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.

10. Id.
11. Prior to Hadley, the law was that "it is, in general, entirely the province of the

jury to assess the amount, with reference to all the circumstances of the case." J.
Chitty, A Practice Treatise on the Law of Contracts 768 (4th ed. 1850).
12. Roy R Anderson, Incidental and Consequential Damages, 7 J.L & Com. 327,
351 (1987); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual

Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821,867-68 (1992); Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 565-66; Arthur

G. Murphey, Jr., Consequential Damages in Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods and the Legacy of Hadley, 23 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L & Econ. 415, 431-32
(1989); Eileen A. Scallen, Comment, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Sea-
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measured damages 13 and are based on the value of the performance
itself,' 4 independent of the buyer's special circumstances, such as the
difference between market price and contract price.' 5 Consequential
damages are those that arise as a secondary consequence of nonper-6
formance resulting from the injured party's special circumstances,'
and typically consist of the loss of profit that would have been made in
transactions with third parties.17 Under the first rule, general damages are recoverable even if unexpected' 8 because they "may fairly
and reasonably be considered... [as] arising naturally, i.e., according
to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself."' 19
Under the second rule, recovery for unexpected consequential losses
is limited. Hadley used various terms to describe the scope of that
stated that the damages must have been a
limitation. The court
"probable result""° of breach, that they must "ordinarily follow"'' z
man's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1161, 1166 n.23
(1985).
13. A buyer's general damages are market-measured, based either on the difference between market price and contract price (e.g., U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (1990)), the
difference between cover price and contract price (e.g., U.C.C. § 2-712(2) (1990)), or
the diminution in value of goods or services caused by breach of warranty (e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1990)). A seller's general damages are also market measured,
based on the difference between contract price and market price (e.g., U.C.C. § 2708(1) (1990)) or the difference between contract price and resale price (e.g., U.C.C.
§ 2-708(2) (1990)). See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.3(3), at 297 (2d ed.
Practitioner Treatise Ser. 1993) ("General damages are market-measured damages.
They value the plaintiff's entitlement by looking at its value on some real or supposed
market.").
Professor Anderson has defined general damages as damages "based on the value
of the goods, whether their value as measured by the available market, a substitute
cover purchase, or on the worth warranted by the seller." Anderson, supra note 12, at
328.
14. See 3 Dobbs, supra note 13, § 12.4(1), at 62; Anderson, supra note 12, at 32829.
15. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (1990) (providing that the buyer may recover "the
difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach
and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages").
16. 3 Dobbs, supra note 13, § 12.4(1), at 62; Anderson, supra note 12, at 329; Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 565.
17. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 565. Consequential damages may include lost profits from lost resale contracts, losses and expenses caused by defective or undelivered
goods purchased for production, lost goodwill, third-party claims brought against the
buyer of defective goods, loss of use of defective property (including the rental value
of substitute goods), interest, attorney's fees, personal injury or property damage. See
Anderson, supra note 12, at 399.
18. See sources cited supra note 12.
19. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341,354,156 Eng. Rep. 145,151 (1854). See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 565 ("General damages are never barred by the principle of
Hadley v. Baxendale because by their very definition such damages should 'reasonably be considered ... [as] arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of

things from the breach.'" (quoting Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep.
at 151)).
20. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
21. Id.
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from breach, that they must occur in the "great multitude"'

of cases,

and that they must have been in "the contemplation of both parties."' By using these alternative, undefined terms, Hadley left unresolved the precise degree to which loss has to be predictable before
consequential damages can be recovered.
B.

Modern Approaches to Hadley

Among the various terms used by Hadley, most courts have

adopted the one that limits recovery to those losses which, at the time
of the formation of the contract, were "a probable result of the

breach."'24 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that consequential damages may be recovered if they were "a probable result
of the breach when the contract was made ...

as a result of special

circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in
breach had reason to know."' But courts freely interchange these
expressions with the statement that consequential damages may be

recovered if they were a "foreseeable" result of breach.

6

By doing

so, they keep shrouded in ambiguity the degree to which loss must be

predictable in order to be recovered. While the term "probable"
would appear to mean statistically probable, that is, more likely than
not, the term "foreseeable" suggests a lower level of likelihood.'
22. Id. at 355, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
23. Id. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
24. See, e.g., Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 839 P.2d 10, 29 n.11
(Haw. 1992); Enlow v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 P.2d 617, 623 (Kan. 1991); Stone v.
Chicago Title Ins. Co., 624 A.2d 496, 501 (Md. 1993); Drews Co. v. Ledwith-\Volfe
Assocs., 371 S.E.2d 532, 535 (S.C. 1988); Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants, 815 P.2d
1362, 1373 (Wash. 1991); Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 405 N.W.2d 354, 383 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987).
25. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 351(1), (2)(b) (1979). For a discussion
of the term "reason to know" see infra note 132.
26. See, e.g., White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Idaho 1986);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Day, 487 So. 2d 830, 835 (Miss. 1986); Hydraform Products Corp. v. American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339, 345 (N.H. 1985);
Welch v. United States Bancorp Realty & Mortgage Trust, 596 P.2d 947, 963 (Or.
1979); Turner v. Benson, 672 S.W.2d 752, 754-55 (Tenn. 1984); Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985).
27. Several courts have stated that consequential damages may be recovered even
though their occurrence was less than a probable result of breach. See, eg., Caspe v.
Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc., 658 F.2d 613, 617 (8th Cir. 1981) ("The general rule does
not require the plaintiff to show that the actual harm suffered was the most foreseeable of possible harms. He need only demonstrate that his harm was not so remote as
to make it unforeseeable to a reasonable man at the time of contracting." (quoting
Hector Martinez & Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 982 (1980))); Affiliated Foods, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Marine
Management, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 838, 843 (D. P.R. 1986); Sun Maid Raisin Growers v.
Victor Packing Co., 194 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (Ct. App. 1983) ("The possibility of 'disastrous' rain damage to the 1976 raisin crop was clearly foreseeable to appellants.");
National Farmers Org., Inc. v. McCook Feed & Supply Co., 243 N.W.2d 335, 339
(Neb. 1976); Harbor Hill Lithographing Corp. v. Dittler Bros., Inc., 348 N.Y.S.2d 920,
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Most courts have avoided the interpretational dilemma of reconciling
these terms by leaving them undefined.

The Uniform Commercial Code28 distinguishes consequential damages for commercial loss, such as lost profits caused by a shutdown of
operations, from loss caused by injury to person or property.29 With
respect to personal injury and property damage, U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b)
permits recovery of all damages "proximately resulting ' 30 from
breach. With respect to economic loss, U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) permits
recovery of consequential damages for "any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the
time of contracting had reason to know."' 31 This language of section 2715(2)(a) appears alien to Hadley, but the Official Comments to the
32
Code state that it was intended to incorporate the common law rule.
The courts have agreed.3 3 But rather than attempting to reconcile the

Code language with that of Hadley, courts interpreting section 2923 (Sup. Ct. 1973)("[T]he possibility, if not probability, of anticipated profit from
resale was reasonably within the contemplation of the parties.").
28. The Uniform Commercial Code is hereinafter referred to as the U.C.C. or the
Code.
29. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) governs recovery of commercial or economic loss, while
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) governs recovery of losses from personal injury or property
damage. The statutory scheme is somewhat convoluted. An aggrieved buyer is accorded the right to recover consequential damages by §§ 2-712(2), 2-713(1), and 2714(3), but those provisions permit recovery only of consequential damages as defined in § 2-715.
30. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) defines consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach to include "injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty." The "proximately resulting" language of § 2-715(2)(b) has been interpreted to invoke the comparatively forgiving standards of tort proximate causation.
According to Professor Anderson: "The standard for recovery in a (2)(b) case is
'proximately resulting,' a tort standard conceptually broader than the contract standard in (2)(a) of 'reason to know.'" Anderson, supra note 12, at 450. See James J
White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 470 (3d ed. 1988) ("The
crucial word is 'proximately,' a word that imports into the Code ... the many tort
cases on proximate cause which courts turn out in every jurisdiction of the United
States every year.").
31. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) provides:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and
which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1990). This provision is framed, not in the traditional terms of
whether the seller had reason to know or foresee the buyer's loss, but rather in terms
of whether the seller had reason to know the requirements and needs of the buyer
from which the loss resulted. The inquiry is thus shifted from the foreseeability of the
buyer's loss to the foreseeability of the buyer's requirements and needs.
32. The U.C.C. follows "the older rule at common law which made the seller liable
for all consequential damages of which he had 'reason to know.' "U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt.
2 (1990).
33. See, e.g., Troxler Elecs. Lab., Inc. v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 722 F.2d 81, 84-85
(4th Cir. 1983); Lenox, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Alarm, 738 F. Supp. 262, 266 (N.D. Ill.
1990); Anna Ready Mix, Inc. v. N.E. Pierson Const. Co., 747 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (S.D.
Ill. 1990); Sun Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co., 194 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (Ct.
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715(2)(a) have tended to adopt the common law approach 34 of addressing the issue of consequential damages under the Code as a ques-

tion of foreseeability, allowing recovery
if damages are foreseeable
35
and denying recovery if they are not.

It is possible that Hadley has remained the law of the land for more
than a century not in spite of, but because of, its ambiguity. That is
the position taken by Professor Anderson, who contends that:
[W]hat is so often overlooked about the Hadley v. Baxendale standard is that we were never meant to understand its precise meaning.
What more effective method of controlling jury discretion than placing a standard
in the hands of the trial judge, which only he can
36
apply?

Professor Anderson may be correct. While Hadley would not be the

only rule that was framed in ambiguity to create justice,37 however,
the idea that from obfuscation comes justice is not one of the accepted
tenets of our legal system. Ambiguous rules have the capacity to
achieve injustice with equal, if not greater, likelihood. They tend to

endure not because of the value of their ambiguity but because their
underlying policies have not been stated with sufficient precision to
38
permit those rules to be discarded or clarified.
App. 1983); Cricket Alley Co. v. Data Terminal Sys. Inc., 732 P.2d 719, 725 (Kan.

1987).
34. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Hendricks & Assocs., Inc. v. Daewoo Corp., 923 F.2d 209, 214-15 (1st
Cir. 1991); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 653 (3rd Cir.
1990); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Krebs Eng'rs, 859 F.2d 501, 506-07 (7th Cir. 1988);
Taylor & Gaskin, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., 732 F.2d 1273, 1278 (6th Cir. 1984); Blue
Circle At., Inc. v. Falcon Materials, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 516, 523 (D. Md. 1991); Brandon & Tibbs v. George Kevorkian Acct. Corp., 277 Cal. Rptr. 40,48 (Ct. App. 1990);
AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915, 921 (Pa. 1990).
36. Anderson, supra note 12, at 353.
37. For example, the term "scope of employment" as it applies to the doctrine of
respondeatsuperiorhas been described as "so devoid of meaning in itself that its very
vagueness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree of flexibility in decisions." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 70, at 502
(5th ed. 1984). See Jane B. Korn, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Serual
Harassment,67 Tul. L. Rev. 1363, 1419 (1993); Rochelle R. Weber, Note, "Scope of
Employment" Redefined& Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults
Committed by Their Employees, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1513, 1541 (1992).
38. See generally Christopher L. Kutz, Note, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy
and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 Yale L. J. 997 (1994). An example of an
ambiguous term whose endurance in the law can be attributed to confusion rather
than to design can be found in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which has traditionally
required that the defendant be in "exclusive control" of the instrumentality that
caused the accident. See Keeton et al., supra note 37, § 39, at 248-53. Courts continue
to pay homage to the term "exclusive control" despite their inability to agree on its

meaning. Id When it was understood and agreed that the purpose of the term was to
assure that res ipsa loquiturwould be limited to those defendants who were likely to
be found at fault, it became apparent that proof of exclusive control, however defined, was an ill-suited means to achieve that end, and, as a result, the requirement of
exclusive control is rapidly being rejected. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D
cmt. g (1965). See also Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 1220,
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It is suggested that such is the case with Hadley and its progeny.
The reasons why the Hadley court imposed its novel rule never have
been clearly understood. It has been asserted that the court's purpose
was to promote predictability by restricting liability.3 9 But most scholars have ignored this premise and instead have attempted to explain
Hadley as a rule that promotes economic efficiency by encouraging
the disclosure of risk-related information. 40 Despite scholarly contributions on the subject, 4 1 disagreement as to the meaning and value of
Hadley continues. Without the guidance of clearly defined underlying
policies, disagreement and ambiguity are inevitable.
C. Focus
This Article seeks to ascertain the extent to which commercial
losses, including those that are unexpected or unusual, should be recovered as consequential damages. It focuses on consequential damages incurred by commercial buyers involving purely economic loss.

It does not consider the appropriate standard for the recovery of general damages or consequential damages for injury to person or property. Nor does it cover consequential damages for economic losses
not incurred in a commercial context, such as damages measured by
fair rental value when consumers are deprived of the use of their
goods.4 z The term "commercial loss" will be used interchangeably

1223-24 (Ala. 1992); Giles v. City of New Haven, 636 A.2d 1335, 1338 (Conn. 1994);
Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Ky. 1992); Poulin v. Aquaboggan Waterslide, 567 A.2d 925, 926 (Me. 1989); Enrich v. Windmere Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1081, 1085
(Mass. 1993); Valley Properties Ltd. Partnership v. Steadman's Hardware, Inc., 824
P.2d 250, 254 (Mont. 1992); Konicki v. Lawrence, 475 A.2d 208, 210 (R.I. 1984).
39. See Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof
the Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 249, 277 (1975); Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 569.
40. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.3, at 846-47 (2d ed. 1990); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 61 (2d ed. 1977); Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 4, at 101-02; John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of
Contract,1 J. Legal Stud. 277, 296 (1972); Juliet P. Kostritsky, BargainingWith Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for PrecontractualNegotiations, 44 Hastings L.J. 621, 684 (1993).
This purported justification is not without its detractors, who contend that Hadley's
rule of restricted liability does not fairly and efficiently promote disclosure. See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 602-04; Johnston, supra note 4, at 632-33.
41. See sources cited supra note 4; see also Barnett, supra note 12, at 867; Lucian
A. Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Shared Information and the Scope of Liability for
Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 284
(1991); Danzig, supra note 39, at 249; Franco Ferrari, ComparativeRuminations on the
Foreseeability of Damages in Contract Law, 53 La. L. Rev. 1257 (1993); Janet T.
Landa, Hadley v. Baxendale and the Expansion of the Middleman Economy, 16 J.
Legal Stud. 455 (1987); Posner, supra note 40.
42. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 431 ("Consumer buyers often incur consequential damages in the form of rental value of substitutes rented to accomplish the
use for which the buyer purchased the contracted goods.").
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with the term "economic loss"'4 3 and the term "commercial damages"

will be used interchangeably with the term "economic damages."
In most cases, consequential economic loss, unlike personal injury,
property damage and general damages, results only if the breaching

party is the seller." The buyer's breach ordinarily involves the late
payment or nonpayment of money, seldom resulting in consequential
economic damages. For this reason and for purposes of convenience,
the breaching party will hereafter be referred to as the seller and the

victim of breach as the buyer.
In re-evaluating the standard for the recovery of consequential
damages for commercial loss, all relevant policies, not merely those
that can be attributed to the rule of Hadley, are considered. From this

broad perspective, it becomes apparent that there is a potential conflict among policies, that no single policy is of paramount importance
in every situation, and that an inflexible rule that seeks to promote
one policy in all situations is misguided.

43. Judge Posner, in reference to the economic loss doctrine, explained why the
term "commercial loss" may be preferable:
It would be better to call it a "commercial loss," not only because personal
injuries and especially property losses are economic losses, too-they destroy values which can be and are monetized-but also, and more important,
because tort law is a superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely commercial disputes.
Miller v. United States Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990). Accord
Theuerkauf v. United Vaccines Div., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (W.D. Mich. 1993);
Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 616 (Mich. 1992).
44. Aside from difficulties of proof, the seller may be legally precluded from recovering consequential damages. Section 1-106 of the U.C.C. provides that "neither
consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law." U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1990). The Code specifically provides for buyers' recovery of consequential damages (U.C.C. §§ 2-713(1), 2714(3) and 2-715(2) (1990)), but it is conspicuously silent with respect to sellers' recovery of consequential damages. As a result, the courts have consistently concluded
that the Code prohibits sellers from recovering consequential damages. See, eg.,
Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358,1368 (7th Cir. 1985);
Nobs Chemical, U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212,216 (5th Cir. 1980); Atlantic Paper Box Co. v. Whitman's Chocolates, 844 F. Supp. 1038, 1045-46 (E.D. Pa.
1994); Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 590 F. Supp. 18,2122 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd mera., 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1983; Petroleo Brasileiro,
S.A., Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Florida Mining & Materials Corp. v. Standard Gypsum Corp., 550 So. 2d 47,49 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989); S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 286 N.W.2d 34, 43 (Mich. Ct. App.
1979); USX Corp. v. Union Pac. Resources Co., 753 S.W.2d 845, 856 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988); Sprague v. Sumitomo Forestry Co., Ltd., 709 P.2d 1200, 1205 (Wash. 1985). See
generally, Roy R. Anderson, In Support of ConsequentialDamages For Sellers, 11 J.L
& Coin. 123 (1992) (advocating remedies to balance current remedies available to
both parties).
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CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE LIMITS ON
THE RECOVERY OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR
ECONOMIC Loss

A.

Distinguishing Tort Theory from Contract Theory

The recovery of damages under tort law theory is evaluated from a
different perspective than under contract law theory. By designating
conduct as tortious, the law has made a conclusive determination that
such conduct is so reprehensible or dangerous that it must be deterred
through expansive liability, including punitive damages, 45 irrespective
of whatever countervailing economic consequences to the tortfeasor
or society may ensue.46 In furtherance of this policy, the broad tort
foreseeability doctrine, allowing the victim compensation for all but
extraordinary injuries,4 7 and the doctrine that the tortfeasor takes the
45. 1 Dobbs, supra note 13, § 3.11(3), at 476-82; Keeton et al., supra note 37, § 2,
at 9; Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 77, at 275 (1935);
Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages,56 S.Cal. L. Rev. 79, 90
(1982); Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort
Law, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1385, 1405-06 (1987) ("While the open-ended and to a large
degree arbitrary magnitude of punitive damages may call into question the fairness of
these damages, optimal deterrence is not inconsistent with unlimited and variable
awards."); Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit
Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 Emory LJ.303, 324-25 (1991) ("Concerns
about unpredictable punitive damage awards become less significant when one remembers that such awards are intended not only to punish the present defendant, but
also to deter future tortfeasors.").
46. "There is now a rich body of academic literature supporting the view that a
primary purpose of tort law liability rules is to discourage inappropriate behavior on
the part of accident causers." John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 901(c) (1979); Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic
Analysis 68 (1970); Keeton et al., supra note 37, § 4, at 23; Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 187, 202-04 (4th ed. 1992); G. Edward White, Tort Law in
America-An Intellectual History 222-37 (1980); Philip H. Corboy, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: The Effort to Constitutionalize"Tort Reform", 2 Seton Hall
Const. L.J. 5, 10 (1991) ("It is a fundamental aim of tort law not only to compensate
the victims of tortious conduct, but also to deter such misconduct."); William H.
Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability: A Murky CrystalBallfor PredictingLiability, 23 Cumb. L.
Rev. 349, 406 (1993); David G. Owen, Deterrenceand Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73
Cal. L. Rev. 665, 666-70 (1985); Richard Pierce, InstitutionalAspects of Tort Reform,
73 Cal. L. Rev. 917, 930-31 (1985); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible
End of the Rise of Modem American Tort Law, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 601, 607, 617-19 (1992);
Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 Kan. L. Rev. 115,
115 (1993) ("Deterrence delineates tort law. Tort law seeks to reduce injury by deterring unsafe behavior and that goal informs tort standards for behavior.").
47. The proximate cause limitation for the tort of negligence has traditionally been
expressed in terms of foreseeability. Injuries are deemed unforeseeable only if it appears highly extraordinary that the tortious conduct would have caused the type of
injury suffered by the plaintiff. Williford v. L.J. Carr Invs., Inc., 783 P.2d 235, 240
(Alaska 1989); Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913, 918 (Ct.
App. 1993); accord Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14, 21 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Masotti v. Console, 552 N.E.2d 1292, 1297 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990);
Mobley v. Rego Co., 412 So. 2d 1143, 1152 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Henley v. Prince
George's County, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (Md. 1986); Rae v. Air-Speed, Inc., 435 N.E.2d
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plaintiff as he finds her,48 are designed to assure that only in the most
exceptional cases will a victim's full compensation be denied.
When injury is caused by breach of contract, the analysis differs.
Because breach of contract is not necessarily so reprehensible or dangerous as to constitute a tort,49 it is improper to presume that as a
matter of social policy breach must be deterred through expansive liability. Instead of permitting full recovery for all but extraordinary
losses, irrespective of the consequences, 0 the countervailing economic
consequences that are justifiably ignored in tort law must be considered. 1 These consequences may be sufficiently important to justify
628, 632 (Mass. 1982); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., 365
S.E.2d 909, 915 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Brown v. Tinneny, 421 A.2d 839, 844 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has formulated an alternative, victim-friendly
limitation. It rejects foreseeability as a determinant, stating that "ti]f the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in
which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 435(1) (1965). It substitutes a hindsight approach: "The actor's conduct may
be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking
back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly
extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm." Id. § 435(2). See Keeton
et al., supra note 37, § 43, at 298-99.
It is a conceptual challenge to comprehend how an injury can be highly extraordinary if the evaluation is made with full knowledge of the setting and all that occurred.
From a hindsight perspective, the injury was not only predictable, it was inevitable.
Ignoring this conundrum, a significant and growing number of courts have adopted
the Restatement approach. See, eg., Cota v. Harley Davidson, 684 P.2d 888, 893
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222, 1228 (Fla.
1992); Lee v. Chicago Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 503 (IIl. 1992); Stone v. Chicago
Title Ins. Co., 624 A.2d 496,500 (Md. 1993); Williams v. Taylor Mach., Inc., 529 So. 2d
606, 610 (Miss. 1988); Andor v. United Air Lines, 719 P.2d 492, 497 (Or. Ct. App.
1986); Bell v. Irace, 619 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Musch v. H-D Coop.,
Inc., 487 N.W.2d 623,624 (S.D. 1992); Banks v. City of Richmond, 348 S.E.2d 280,283
(Va. 1986); Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1093 (Wyo. 1985).
48. "It is as if a magic circle were drawn about the person, and one who breaks it,
even by so much as a cut on the finger, becomes liable for all resulting harm to the
person, although it may be death." Keeton et al., supra note 37, § 43, at 291.
49. See infra note 52.
50. See supra note 46.
51. Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629,630 (1988); Thomas A. Diamond, The Tort of Bad
Faith Breach of Contract: When, If at A14 Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance
Transactions, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 425, 436-40 (1981); E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss
or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract,94
Yale L.J. 1339, 1380-81 (1985); M.N. Kniffin, A Newly Identified Contract Unconscionability: Unconscionabilityof Remedy, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 247, 250 (1988); W.
David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 Cornell L Rev. 197,
217 (1990); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of ContractRemedies, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341,344 (1984); Louis E. Wolcher,
The Accommodation of Regret in Contract Remedies, 73 Iowa L Rev. 797, 802-03
(1988); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82
Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1369-70 (1982).
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greater limits on liability than in tort law.5 2 Furthermore, because
contracts involve bargained-for exchanges 53 that allocate risk by

agreement rather than by the will of society, the intent of the parties is
relevant to determining the extent to which compensation for breach
of contract should be allowed. 4 In tort law, however, it is the will of
society, not the intent of the parties, that determines the scope of
liability.

The difference in perspective between tort theory and contract theory is exemplified by the "economic loss doctrine," which provides
that a party suffering purely commercial or economic loss from a defective product is relegated to contract remedies, and that without
personal injury or property damage there can be no independent tort
flowing from a breach of contract. 6 The reasoning supporting this
52. Contract rules regarding privity, punitive damages and disclaimers of liability
reflect a policy in favor of limiting liability in contract law to a greater extent than in
tort law. Traditional contract law required privity of contract between plaintiff and
defendant for any recovery. Although the privity doctrine has been significantly
eroded in contract law, a substantial body of case law continues to impose it for economic loss. See White and Summers, supra note 30, § 11-6, at 466-67. For a collection
of cases denying recovery of economic loss for lack of privity see infra note 197. Unlike in tort law, punitive damages may not be recovered for breach of contract. 3
Dobbs, supra note 13, § 12.5(2). See also sources cited supra note 45. Contract law
also recognizes the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers of liability to a greater
extent than tort law. See infra note 170.
53. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1979). The relationship between bargaining and the doctrine of consideration is discussed in E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 2-2, at 43-45 (2d ed. 1990).
54. It has been recognized that in the context of commercial contracts the agreement of the parties is of major relevance in determining the extent of liability for
economic loss resulting from breach. In Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 15051 (Cal. 1965), Justice Traynor justified his view that commercial economic loss should
be compensated only in contract and not in tort on the ground that in the context of
commercial sales the agreement of the parties should determine the extent of liability
undertaken by a seller. This thesis underlies the economic loss doctrine. See infra
notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
55. Dean Prosser distinguished tort from contract along the same lines:
The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of
the interests protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest in
freedom from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise
to them are imposed by the law, and are based primarily upon social policy,
and not necessarily upon the will or intention of the parties .... Contract
actions are created to protect the interest in having promises performed.
Contract obligations are imposed because of conduct of the parties manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named in the
contract.
William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971) (citation
omitted). See also Keeton et al., supra note 37, § 92, at 655-56 (discussing the distinctions between tort and contract liability); Dana Rae Landsdorf, California'sDetortification of Contract Law: Is the Seaman's Tort Dead?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 213, 217-22
(1992) ("Whereas the goal of contract actions is to enforce the intentions of the parties to the agreement, the goal of tort law is primarily to vindicate 'social policy.' ").
56. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871
(1986); Jones v. Childers, 18 F.3d 899, 904 (11th Cir. 1994); Purvis v. Consolidated
Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217,222-23 (4th Cir. 1982); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

1994]

HADLEY v. BAXENDALE

doctrine is that the threat of physical injuries from dangerous products

justifies circumventing the parties' contractually agreed allocation of
risks in order to impose expansive tort liability. "However, where the
loss is purely economic, the manufacturer cannot be charged with the
responsibility of ensuring that the product meet the particular expectations of the consumer unless it is aware of those expectations and
has agreed that the product will meet them.

'

v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 285-90 (3d Cir. 1980); Morrow v. New
Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 283-86 (Alaska 1976); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 445-48 (Ill. 1982); AJ. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 634 A.2d 1330, 1332-33 (Md. 1994); Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc.,
486 N.W.2d 612, 615-18 (Mich. 1992); Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 68688 (Minn. 1990); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 66568 (NJ. 1985).
For a discussion of the economic loss doctrine see Alex Devience, Jr., The Developing Line Between Warranty and Tort Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
Does 2-318 Make a Difference?, 2 DePaul Bus. LJ. 295, 313-22 (1990); David B.
Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.C C., 61 Ind. LJ. 593 (1986); William
K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract
over Tort, 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 731, 752-58 (1990); Jane D. Quasarano, Commercial
Transactionsand Contracts, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 399, 400-06 (1993); Richard E. Speidel,
ProductsLiability, Economic Loss and the U.C.C., 40 Tenn. L. Rev. 309, 316 1973;
John W. Wade, Tort Liabilityfor Products Causing PhysicalInjury and Article 2 of the
U.C.C., 48 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 24-26 (1983).
57. The economic loss doctrine has been explained in terms of the distinction between tort and contract policy:
The distinction between tort recovery for physical injury and warranty recovery for economic loss derives from policy considerations which allocate
the risks related to a defective product between the seller and the purchaser.
A manufacturer may be held liable for physical injuries, including harm to
property, caused by defects in its products because it is charged with the
responsibility to ensure that its products meet a standard of safety creating
no unreasonable risk of harm. However, where the loss is purely economic,
the manufacturer cannot be charged with the responsibility of ensuring that
the product meet the particular expectations of the consumer unless it is
aware of those expectations and has agreed that the product will meet them.
Thus, generally, the only recovery for a purely economic loss would be under
a contract theory.
AJ. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 634 A.2d 1330, 1332-33 (Md. 1994)
(citations omitted).
In explaining why purely economic loss should be governed by
contract law, one court emphasized the importance of permitting parties to rely on
their contractual allocation of risk:
This rule proceeds from the theory that courts must preserve well-defined
conceptual and practical distinctions between the body of law relating to
contract damages and tort damages, so that contracting parties may rely confidently on their allocation of risk without fear that their counterparts will
seek to recoup contract damages through tort actions.... Accordingly, the
economic loss doctrine provides that "parties to a contract can only seek tort
damages if conduct occurs that establishes a 'tort "distinguishable from or
independent of [the] breach of contract." '
Jones v. Childers, 18 F.3d 899, 904 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
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B. The Relevant Policies
The following policies are relevant in fashioning the appropriate
standard for the commercial buyer's recovery of consequential economic damages: (1) compensating the victim of breach; (2) deterring
inefficient breach; (3) promoting the reliability of contracts; (4) reducing subsidization of loss by the buying public; (5) promoting predictability; (6) encouraging disclosure of information concerning the
buyer's special circumstances relevant to the consequences of breach;
and (7) limiting liability consistent with the parties' likely allocation of
risk. Because this Article is limited to commercial losses, the generally recognized policy of consumer protection58 is not relevant in this
context.
1. Compensating the Victim of Breach
An important principle of contract damages is to protect the aggrieved party's expectation interest by putting that party in the same
position as though the contract had been performed. 59 Therefore, one
must give due weight to the economic injuries of the buyer as the victim of breach, because only full compensation will put the buyer in the
same position as if the seller had performed. A properly fashioned
rule for consequential damages, however, will not necessarily provide
58. The policy of consumer protection has been decisive in the development of
product liability law to address personal injury or property damage caused by defective products. The Supreme Court of Minnesota expressed its concern for consumers
in the following terms:
Generally speaking, a consumer has neither the skill nor the bargaining
power to negotiate either warranties or remedies. If a defective coffee pot
causes a fire which destroys a consumer's home, the panoply of liability theory should be available to the consumer-strict products liability and negligence as well as breach of warranty ....
On the other hand, the law is entitled to expect the parties to commercial
transactions to be knowledgeable and of relatively equal bargaining power
so that warranties can be negotiated to the parties' mutual advantage.
Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990). See also Spring Motors
Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 670 (N.J. 1985) ("[S]trict liability
evolved as a judicial response to inadequacies in sales law with respect to consumers
who sustained physical injuries from defective goods made or distributed by remote
parties in the marketing chain.").
59. Contract damages are ordinarily designed to protect the aggrieved party's expectation interest by putting the aggrieved party in the same position as though the
contract had been performed. See Farnsworth, supra note 40, § 12.1, at 839-41. As
observed by Professor Farnsworth:
The basic principle for the measurement of those [contract] damages is that
of compensation based on the injured party's expectation. One is entitled to
recover an amount that will put one in as good a position as one would have
been in had the contract been performed.
Id. § 12.8, at 871 (citations omitted).
The expectation measure of damages is the preferred measure under the U.C.C.,
which provides that its remedies should be interpreted so that "the aggrieved party
may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed." U.C.C.
§ 1-106 (1990). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(a) (1979).
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full compensation for all economic loss, even if failure to recover that
loss will leave the buyer in a worse position than if the contract had
been performed.' Other policy considerations might supply a reason
for limiting such recovery.61
2. Deterring Inefficient Breach
Breaches will be deterred as liability for unexpected losses increases
because sellers will be induced to take additional measures to assure
performance and to avoid the potentially disastrous economic consequences of expansive liability. When a breach consists of selling a
dangerous product, which results in personal injury or property damage, deterrence of such a breach has been recognized as a compelling
goal, justifying broad liability irrespective of the adverse economic
consequences. 62 In the context of breach resulting in purely economic
loss, however, deterring breach is merely one of several policies that
must be considered. In such cases, the weight to be afforded to the
policy of deterrence depends on whether the economic benefits of a
rule sufficiently draconian to deter breach exceed the resulting economic costs. 63 Deterrence would have an economically beneficial impact if it could be limited to inefficient breaches. An inefficient breach
is one in which the buyer's losses from breach exceed or equal the
seller's gains.' For example, if the seller breaches to take advantage
60. As Professor Yorio observed in this regard:
Since the compensation principle itself derives from considerations of fairness and efficiency, it may be appropriate to deny the promisee compensation whenever reasons of fairness or efficiency support the award of a lesser
amount.... Thus, although compensation may be a goal-indeed an important goal-of our system of contract remedies, it is not the sole desideratum.
Yorio, supra note 51, at 1369-70.
61. Id at 1370-76.
62. See cases cited supra note 57. In the words of the Supreme Court, "[PJublic
policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market."
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) (citation
omitted).
63. The U.C.C. recognizes a dichotomy between personal injury and property
damage on the one hand and economic loss on the other by imposing more expansive
liability for personal injury and property damage than for purely economic loss.
U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1990). See supra notes 29-31.
64. The definitions of efficient breach and inefficient breach have been formulated
in terms of whether there is a net benefit from breach, considering both the gains
from breach and the losses:
At the time the agreement is made, each party has reason to suppose that it
will be profitable for that party. A party may, however, err in calculating the
net benefit to be anticipated from performance of the agreement, or circumstances may change so as to disappoint that party's initial hopes. A contract
that the party once thought would be profitable may turn out to be unprofitable.... If nonperformance of the agreement would result in a gain by the
reluctant party at the expense of a loss by the other party, the result of nonperformance is economically efficient only if the value of the gain to the
reluctant party is greater than the value of the loss to the other party....
The
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of a market price that exceeds the contract price, the seller's resulting
economic gains will be greater than or equal to the losses incurred by
the buyer in obtaining equivalent goods or services at the increased
price. Such a breach is inefficient and should be deterred. 5 It is not
in the public interest to deter breaches that are efficient, however, because society benefits when the seller's economic gains from breach
exceed the buyer's losses.6 6 For example, if the seller chooses to reallocate its67 resources in a manner that prevents performance of its
contract with the buyer, but that reallocation allows the seller to profit
in an amount greater than the buyer's loss, such a breach is efficient
and should not be discouraged. Indiscriminately imposing liability for
unexpected losses will have a chilling effect on sellers' willingness to
commit efficient breaches due to fear of unknowable and potentially
disastrous liability." It is therefore preferable to limit expansive liability in a manner that deters only inefficient breaches.
party in breach may gain enough from the breach to have a net benefit ....
If this is so, nonperformance and the consequent reallocation of resources is
socially desirable, and economic theory not only sanctions but encourages
breach. The breach is often called an "efficient breach."
Farnsworth, supra note 40, § 12.3, at 846-47 (citation omitted). See also Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 107-08 (3rd ed. 1986); Robert L. Birmingham,
Breach of Contract,DamagesMeasures,and Economic Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L.J. 273,
284-86 (1970) (discussing the efficiency of a breach where the promisor is able to
profit from his default after placing the promisee in as good a position as he would
have been if performance had been rendered); Yorio, supra note 51, at 1369-70 (discussing efficiency generally).
65. Farnsworth, supra note 40, § 12.3, at 845-48; A.M. Polinsky, An Introduction
to Law and Economics 25-36 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
93-95, 105-15 (3rd ed. 1986) (Contract law remedies have "the objective of giving the
promisor an incentive to fulfill his promise unless the result would be an inefficient
use of resources."); Birmingham, supra note 64, at 284-86; Frank J. Cavico, Jr., Puni.
five Damagesfor Breach of Contract-A PrincipledApproach,22 St. Mary's L.J. 357,
371 (1990) ("In addition to permitting and encouraging contract parties to make efficient breaches, the law, by implication, should also deter inefficient breaches."); Diamond, supra note 51, at 453-54; George K. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principlesof
the Law of Contracts, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 32 (1932) ("IT]he law affords only such
remedies for breach of promise as seem most likely to promote the orderly and efficient conduct of the community's economic life."); Andrew L. Merritt, Damagesfor
Emotional Distress in FraudLitigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1989) ("IT]he law does not wish to discourage 'efficient' breaches
of contracts."); Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59
Fordham L. Rev. 227, 254 (1990) ("Contract law is designed to foster efficient breach
....

1

.

66. See sources cited supra note 65.
67. Because commercial buyers and sellers tend to be legal entities rather than
individuals, each will be referred to by the pronoun "it."
68. Diamond, supra note 51, at 448; Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty & ContractLaw, 46
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75, 83 (1984) ("Because the outcome of litigating a contract dispute
may be uncertain, an inefficient breach may occur or an efficient breach may be discouraged."); Richard E.Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 163,
172 (1983); James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of PromissoryServitudes: Toward
Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L.
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As liability for unexpected losses expands to deter breach, other
relevant policies, discussed infra69 will be undermined. It is therefore
important to limit expansive liability to those breaches that are most
readily capable of being deterred. Intentional and willful breaches are

more readily deterred than unintentional breaches. To the extent that
the threat of expansive liability induces the desire to perform, intentional and willful breaches will necessarily be avoided."0 Conversely,
an unintentional breach is less likely to be avoided by the mere desire
to perform because it is not the result of a conscious decision to

breach.7 Some unintentional breaches are unavoidable irrespective
of reasonable efforts made to assure performance, 72 as, for example,

Rev. 1, 37 (1989) ("[A]n efficient breach could well be thwarted by uncertainties in
predicting the damage award.").
The effect of uncertain liability on efficient breach can be seen if one imagines a
regime of absolute liability. It might appear that liability without limit would best
deter inefficient breach. Such expansive liability would, however, have a chilling effect on the seller's decision to commit an efficient breach. If the seller reasonably
calculates that its predicted gains would be greater than the buyer's predicted losses,
the seller may be reluctant to commit what would have been an efficient breach if it
will suffer completely indeterminate liability for unexpected buyer losses. By limiting
the seller's liability in cases of apparently efficient breach to the buyer's losses that
could reasonably be expected, and thereby allowing the seller to make its assessment
based on reasonable appearances, efficient breach will be promoted.
69. As liability for unexpected losses expands, the effect will be to undermine the
policy of reducing subsidization of loss by the buying public, see infra part II.B.4, and
the policy of promoting predictability, see infra part II.B.5.
70. Conversely, a seller is less likely to be deterred from breaching as its liability
for consequential damages decreases. Under a forgiving standard of liability for consequential damages, sellers will have less incentive to take precautions to reduce the
risk of breach.
The extent of deterrence resulting from broad liability for consequential economic
damages, however, is conjectural. There are already in place legal and market pressures for sellers to perform. Two rules-U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1990) and the doctrine
of strict tort liability for defective products-already create wide liability, and accompanying deterrence, for the consequential personal injury and property damage. See
supra notes 30 and 56. Only where the risk of economic damages induces measures to
avoid breach not already induced by the risk of personal injury or property damage
would a rule of broad liability for economic losses be an added deterrent. Additionally, the rules that are in place for the recovery of general damages have removed the
incentive for sellers to breach in order to profit from increased market prices. See
supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. Furthermore, those sellers who do not deliver do not get paid, and those sellers who sell shoddy merchandise lose their customers. Market discipline therefore also constitutes an existing and significant deterrent
to breach. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
71. When inattentiveness causes an unintentional breach, it is unclear to what extent expanded liability would induce the caution necessary to avoid the breach. See
infra note 73; see also infra note 158 and accompanying text.
72. Such a seller would be liable despite its efforts and the unavoidability of
breach, because fault is not a required condition for liability for breach. As Professor
Farnsworth stated, "[C]ontract law is, in its essential design, a law of strict liability,
and the accompanying system of remedies operates without regard to fault." Farnsworth, supra note 40, § 12.8, at 875; see Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods, Co.,
408 N.E.2d 1041, 1050 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("Fault is irrelevant to breach of contract.
Whether one intentionally, carelessly, or innocently breaches a contract, he is still
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when a well-maintained delivery truck breaks down and causes a late
delivery or when a product is defective even though the seller used the
utmost care to assure high quality. The threat of liability will not deter these breaches. Even when an unintentional breach is reasonably
expanded liability would induce
avoidable, it is unclear to what extent
73
the caution necessary to prevent it.

In formulating the appropriate standard for the recovery of consequential economic damages, it is therefore necessary to distinguish
those breaches that should be deterred through expansive liability
from those that should not, and to distinguish those breaches that can

be deterred through expansive liability from those that cannot.
3. Promoting the Reliability of Contracts
The reliability of contracts is essential to further economic efficiency because parties plan for the future on the assumption that their
contracts will be performed.7 4 Unless contracts are reliable, their

value is greatly reduced. 75 By permitting the buyer to recover conse-

quential economic losses in an amount that approaches the equivalent
of full performance, expansive liability promotes the reliability of contracts. Furthermore, to the extent that the threat of expansive liability
considered to be in breach of that contract and the extent of his liability is generally
the same."), quoted in Wait v. First Midwest Bank/Danville, 491 N.E.2d 795, 802 (II1.
App. Ct. 1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Akron v. Cann, 503 F. Supp. 419, 437-38
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (stating that whatever the cause of the breach, the measure of damages is the same).
73. Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implicationsfor the Law, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225, 229-44 (1986); Paul J. Heald & James E.
Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1127, 1137 (1991) ("The psychology of
'cognitive illusions' may suggest that legal rules do not deter efficiently because
human beings are unable to process relevant information and draw the inferences
necessary to make the desired (predicted) decision under a given rule."); Howard A.
Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 677,
678-92 (1985).
74. It is important "that businessmen, who must make their arrangements in advance, can rely with certainty on their contracts." Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50
(Cal. 1944) (Justice Traynor); see also Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 574 (recognizing the
importance of the reliability of contracts in economic planning); John Danforth, Note,
Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society's Interest in Commercial
Stability and ContractualIntegrity, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1491, 1515 (1981) ("By guaranteeing future performance, a contract may engender reliance and facilitate long-term
planning....").
75. Professor Farnsworth has observed that contracts are of little use if they cannot be relied upon, and uses that insight to explain the importance of protecting the
parties' expectation interests:
Why, merely because the parties have exchanged promises, should the law
protect one party's ephemeral expectation if the other repudiates before
there has been any actual reliance on its promise? ... One explanation is
that it is justified as the most effective way of protecting reliance. Unless
agreements can be relied upon, they are of little use. A rule of law that only
protected a promisee who had actually relied upon a promise would, in practice, tend to discourage reliance.
Farnsworth, supra note 40, § 1.6, at 18.
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encourages performance, reliability will be promoted by avoiding
breach.76

In evaluating how much weight to give this policy in the context of
consequential damages, it is important to understand how reliability is
impacted by relief from unexpected burdens of performance as compared to relief from unexpected consequential losses caused by

breach. Under the doctrine of impracticability,7 relief from unexpected burdens of performance is afforded only when intervening
events have caused those burdens of performance to be so unexpected

as to be exceptional.78 One of the primary purposes of a contract is

the security given through a binding agreement that remains enforceable irrespective of unanticipated contingencies. That value would be
undermined if the occurrence of those contingencies provided an excuse from the obligations of performance.
Furthermore, the courts have not found partial relief to be a viable
alternative in this context.7 9 Given the choice between full performance and complete excuse, it is understandable why courts insist on

full performance in all but exceptional circumstances. With respect to
the scope of liability for consequential economic losses, however, liability can be limited without being excused. Partial relief is possible so
that even if recovery for abnormally large losses is precluded, the

buyer could still recover for that portion of its losses that was not abnormally large. As a result, partial relief from liability for unexpected
76. To the extent that liability for damages provides both parties with the incentive to perform, both gain assurance that the other party will perform and that the
risks of nonperformance will be avoided. As stated by Professor Eisenberg:
A contracting party, knowing that expectation damages give an adequate
incentive to perform, will be more confident that his reliance on the terms of
the contract will not expose him to undue risk. Accordingly, each contracting
party can plan more reliably, and therefore more effectively, because he can
order his affairs with confidence that he will realize the contract's value.
Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 574.
77. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1990); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1979). See
generally, White & Summers, supra note 30, § 3-9, at 155-68 (discussing when performance is rendered impracticable).
78. Commentators have observed that only in exceptional or unusual cases is the
promisor excused under the doctrine of impracticability. According to Professor
Farnsworth, "The new synthesis [manifested in U.C.C. § 2-615(a) and Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 261] candidly recognizes that the judicial function is to determine whether, in the light of exceptional circumstances, justice requires a departure
from the general rule that a promisor bears the risk of increased difficulty of performance." Farnsworth, supra note 40, § 9.6, at 707 (emphasis added); see also John D.
Wladis, Impracticability as Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circumstances
Upon Contract Obligationsfor the Sale of Goods, 22 Ga. L Rev. 503, 593 (1988)
("[T]he normal commercial sales understanding is that, should an unusual general risk
occur and make the seller's performance commercially impracticable, the deal is

off.").
79. Scholars have suggested that the parties should share the losses when performance becomes impracticable. For a summary see Wladis, supra note 78, at 596-97
n.380. The courts, however, have not adopted the shared loss approach. Id. at 597
n.381.
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consequential losses will not have the same drastic impact upon reliability as would relief for unexpected burdens of performance. Additionally, limiting liability for consequential economic losses will not
undermine the reliability that is assured through the recovery of general damages, which allow full compensation for market-measured
losses and which remove the incentive for sellers to breach in order to
profit from increased market prices. 80
4. Reducing Subsidization of Loss By the Buying Public
A rule for the recovery of consequential damages for commercial
loss should take into account the negative consequences of compelling
the buying public to cross-subsidize commercial buyers' losses through
higher prices. The impact of imposing liability for such losses is that,
the cost of such liability will be passed on to the
in whole or in8part,
1
public.
buying
When a buyer's losses are not purely economic but involve personal
injury or property damage, a rule that imposes liability can be understood as a type of public insurance rather than as subsidization. Because personal injury and property damage can befall any member of
the buying public,82 cost shifting caused by fully compensating the victims for such losses can be viewed as a form of mandatory insurance
with the premiums paid by all buyers through higher prices. 83 "A firm
80. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. Parties will be induced to perform, thereby making contracts reliable, by other factors in addition to the existence
of general damages. Market discipline, that is, the seller's knowledge that
nonperforming sellers lose customers, will promote the incentive to perform even if
liability for consequential economic damages is limited. See infra note 146. Additionally, expansive liability for consequential damages in the nature of personal injury and
property damage will also induce performance regardless of limits on liability for consequential economic damages. See supra note 30.
81. See 3 Dobbs, supra note 13, § 12.4(5); Posner, supra note 40, at 447; see also
Joseph E. Linehan, Note, The Recovery of Economic Loss Damages in Tort: Pennsylvania Law and "SocialAdjustment", 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 203, 231 (1989) ("A seller
who is required to pay breach of warranty damages ...will ultimately pass this cost
onto [sic] the consumer, either directly in the form of higher prices for products or
indirectly through other commercial entities with whom the breaching enterprise
deals.").
82. An exception would be personal injury caused by equipment used solely in a
commercial enterprise. The risk of injury from such equipment would be limited to
employees of the enterprise and would not extend to the general buying public.
83. John Cirace, A Theory of Negligence and Products Liability, 66 St. Johns L.
Rev. 1, 66 (1992) ("Under strict liability ... the product price includes a small premium for insurance against personal injuries that result from mismanufactured products .... ."); Stephen F. Williams, Commentary, Second Best. The Soft Underbelly of
Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 932, 934 (1993) ("In making a purchase
under a strict liability system, the consumer assesses all competing products and services, each with some accident potential and each carrying an insurance policy that
covers the costs of those accidents."); see also Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 123
(Cal. 1985) ("The paramount policy of the strict products liability rule remains the
spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects.").
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that compensates consumers for the harms its product causes will reflect the expected compensation cost in the purchase price. An element of the price thus is an insurance premium ....
Consequential damages for commercial losses are different because
only commercial buyers incur them. Forcing the general public to pay
higher prices in order to reimburse commercial buyers for diminished

profits caused by breach cannot be viewed as a form of mandatory
insurance, but instead as a form of mandatory subsidization. s The

more recovery that is allowed for unusual economic losses, the greater
will be the amount of the subsidy. The increased prices that the public
must pay for such subsidization is economically counterproductive
and inefficient.8 6

Even in a situation where all buyers are commercial buyers, subsidization will result if the seller is unable to distinguish high risk buyers
from others.' If the seller is liable to commercial buyers whose situations cause them to incur abnormal economic losses, and the seller is
unable to ascertain which commercial buyers will likely suffer such
losses, the seller must engage in generalized risk shifting and thus
charge higher prices to all commercial buyers. m For those commercial
buyers who are not abnormally situated, higher prices constitute sub84. Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale LJ. 353, 362 (1988).
85. A similar rationale has been used to justify the economic loss doctrine. The
Illinois Supreme Court observed that "it is preferable to relegate the consumer to...
[contract remedies] rather than requiring the consuming public to pay more for their
product so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility that some of his
products will not meet the business needs of some of his customers." Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 448 (Ill. 1982).
86. The economic inefficiency of such increased prices has been noted. For
example:
[I]f the law were to hold the transferor liable for all the losses of the transferee, then transferors would increase their prices to reflect this increased
risk of doing business. This result would be inefficient in that all customers
would be obliged to contribute to this loss insurance.
Ulen, supra note 51, at 394. Even if such subsidization were economically efficient,
reducing the standard of living of all buyers to benefit the few who have lost business
profits is not necessarily in the public interest.
87. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 100; Craswell, supra note 51, at 659; Gwyn
D. Quillen, Note, ContractDamagesand Cross-Subsidization,61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1125,
1131 (1988); Daniel S. Schecter, Note, Consequential Damage Limitations and CrossSubsidization: An Independent Approach to Uniform Commercial Code Section 2719, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1273, 1292 (1993).
88. From the risk-laden buyer's perspective, generalized risk shifting is preferable:
A knowledgeable buyer ... may prefer to remain indistinguishable from
what the seller wrongly perceives to be the class of similarly situated buyers.
By blending in with the larger class of contractors, a buyer or a seller may
receive a cross-subsidized price because the other side will bargain as if she
is dealing with the average member of the class. A knowledgeable party
may prefer to remain in this inefficient, but cross-subsidized, contractual
pool rather than move to an efficient, but unsubsidized, pool.
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 100.
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sidization and not insurance. As is the case with the general buying
public, compelling all commercial buyers to pay for some commercial
buyers' abnormal losses is counterproductive and inefficient.8 9 While
sellers' expenses incurred through liability for consequential economic
damages will ordinarily be passed on to buyers through higher prices,
market forces will occasionally induce sellers to absorb these expenses.9" Although it is not necessarily in the public interest to have
sellers absorb these costs,9 1 when they are so absorbed, subsidization
of commercial buyers' losses by the buying public is avoided. If it
were possible to assess which sellers absorb such costs and which sellers pass them on, a standard for the recovery of consequential damages for economic loss could be formulated to avoid subsidization. No
such assessment, however, is possible. 2 Therefore, the appropriate
standard for consequential economic damages should attempt to minimize subsidization in a manner compatible with the other relevant
policies.
Short of a complete bar on recovery, no standard governing consequential damages for commercial loss can eliminate subsidization. As
liability is limited by denying recovery for unexpected losses, however,
subsidization will be reduced because fewer costs will be passed on

to the buying public and to normally situated commercial buyers.93
Furthermore, a standard more restrictive than the tort foreseeability
standard would tend to exclude disproportionately large losses 94 and
89. As one commentator noted:
Cross-subsidization results in a number of inefficiencies and inequities, most
of which fall on the shoulders of the subsidizing party but many of which are
felt by the rest of the commercial community. Cross-subsidization causes
inefficient and inequitable behavior because it upsets the proper equilibrium
of incentives and disincentives for efficient behavior.
Schecter, supra note 87, at 1292. See Ulen, supra note 51, at 394 (arguing that holding
transferor liable for all transferee losses results in inefficient price increases by
transferors).
90. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort
Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargaining Power,41
Md. L. Rev. 563,598 (1982); Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalismin the Marketplace, 60 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 649, 712 (1992).
91. By reason of sellers' absorbing extra liability there may be plant closings, layoffs, and lost opportunities for expansion. See Posner, supra note 64, at 447.
92. Liability is only one of innumerable expenses incurred in the production of
goods. Those expenses not passed on, if any, cannot be known in foresight or in
hindsight.
93. "To completely eliminate the cross-subsidization problem in situations where
the seller cannot distinguish among buyers according to risk and change the contract
price to reflect that risk, the maximum damages that should be awarded are damages
that are common to all buyers .

. . ."

Quillen, supra note 87, at 1132. See also Ulen,

supra note 51, at 394-95 ("It would be less costly to relieve those with only ordinary
losses from the cost of contributing to this special insurance fund and instead to place
the full cost of insurance against extraordinary losses on the few who anticipate such
losses.").
94. "Potential liability for consequential damages in commercial contexts, usually
in the form of the buyer's lost profits from the use or resale of the goods in its busi-

HADLEY v. BAXENDALE

1994]
would

thereby

have

a

relatively

great

effect

in

reducing

subsidization.95
5. Promoting Predictability
Although the buyer might prefer full compensation even for unexpected loss, there is a recognized value in limiting liability for breach
of contract to promote predictability. 96 If liability extends to unpredictable economic loss, the seller will not know how to allocate its
resources in response to the threat of liability, resulting in inefficiency
and waste. 97 The seller might raise prices too much or too little, or
might take too many or too few precautions to avoid breach, thereby
wasting valuable resources. As predictability increases, the seller can
better decide how to incorporate future liability expenses into the
price of all its goods and can better decide what quality controls
should be taken to reduce these expenses efficiently.
Consequential economic losses among commercial buyers are, by
their very nature, highly unpredictable. 98 This unpredictability stems
from the fact that the economic consequences of breach tend to vary

greatly among buyers because of each buyer's divergent special cirness, is enormous in comparison to the contract price of the goods." Roy R. Anderson, Failureof EssentialPurpose and Essential Failureon Purpose: A Look at Section
2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. LJ.759, 774 (1977), quoted with approval in McKernan v. United Technologies Corp., 717 F. Supp. 60, 72 (D. Conn.
1989); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 527 A.2d 429, 433 (NJ.
1987).
95. "The greater the deviation between 'ordinary' and minimum or maximum
damages, the greater the severity of the cross-subsidization problem." Quillen, supra
note 87, at 1134.
96. "The generally predictable and circumscribed damages available for breaches
of contract reflect the importance of this value in the commercial context." Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 398 n.33 (Cal. 1988); accord Vernon Fire &
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1976); General Motors Corp. v.
Piskor, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (Md. 1977); Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants, 815 P.2d 1362,
1373 (Wash. 1991); see also Larry Kramer, Return of Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L Rev. 979,
1030 n.161 (1991) ("[P]roviding an efficient and profitable commercial environment
depends on the parties' ability accurately to foretell their rights and liabilities under
[the] contract." (quoting Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum. L Rev.
277, 330 (1990))); Karl L. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective 40
Yale LJ.704, 747 (1931); Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The
Role of Contractand PropertyLaw, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 389, 395 (1993) ("Thus the policies of both contract and property law include creating certainty and predictability to
reduce the parties' planning and transaction costs.").
97. "When damage measures are uncertain, it will be difficult for a party contemplating breach to determine the rationally preferable course of action." Merritt, supra
note 65, at 29 n.141.
98. It has been noted that:
Potential consequential losses ...can exceed, and most likely will exceed,
the value of the goods by an unknown quantum, depending not so much on
the actions and machinations of the seller as on the individual operating
structure of the buyer and on the buyer's contracts and relationships with
third parties.
Schecter, supra note 87, at 1306 (quoting Anderson, supra note 94, at 774).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

cumstances. 99 Unpredictability also occurs because events after the
formation of the contract may cause the buyer to suffer losses that
were, at the time of the formation, not within the parties' expectations. While full predictability can never be achieved, it can be promoted by relieving the seller from liability for losses caused by the
buyer's special circumstances that the seller was not aware of and for
losses that are abnormally large because of unexpected events arising
after the formation of the contract.
6. Encouraging Disclosure of Information Concerning the Buyer's
Special Circumstances Relevant to the Consequences of
Breach
When the seller is apprised of information concerning the extent of
its liability in the event of breach, it has the ability to differentiate
efficiently its contractual response among its buyers according to the
risks presented." ° If the seller knows it is dealing with a high risk
buyer, the seller can choose to forego the contractual relationship, increase the contract price, limit liability by contract, or take individualized precautions to avoid breach. Without the ability to differentiate
among buyers, the seller must take generalized and inaccurate measures in response to the threat of liability.' 0 '
The seller can attempt to determine the likely extent of its liability
in the event of breach either through the buyer's disclosure of pertinent information or from the seller's independent investigation.
When the information concerns the buyer's special circumstances, the
seller cannot reasonably acquire such information through independent investigation, and the only effective means for the seller to acquire
it is through the buyer's disclosure,'02 unless these special circumstances are self-evident. For example, if the seller's breach would deprive the buyer of an unusually large resale profit, the seller can be
made aware of the expanded risk of liability posed by such an unusual
situation only if the buyer informs the seller of this fact. 0 3 The standard for the recovery of consequential damages for economic loss
99. Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 12, at 329 ("It is often said that such damages arise because of the special circumstances of the aggrieved party.").
100. Posner, supra note 40, § 4.11, at 94-95; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 10103; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 117 (1985) ("Disclosure... allows the other party to take extra
precautions or to charge appropriate compensation for bearing increased risk."); Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 687-88.
101. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 102; Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 687-88.
102. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 101-03; Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 684-88.
103. In explaining the reason behind the rule that limits a seller's liability to those
losses that would ordinarily follow based upon the circumstances known to both parties, the Hadley court stated, "For, had the special circumstances been known, the
parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to
the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive
them." Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 355, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
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should therefore be formulated to encourage the buyer to disclose

such special circumstances. 104 Imposing significant limitations on the
buyer's recovery in the absence of disclosure is the most effective

method for achieving this result. 10 5
When information concerning the extent of the buyer's loss does
not concern the buyer's special circumstances, the seller ordinarily has
equal access to such information"

and is able to acquire it through

independent investigation. For example, the seller ordinarily has the
same ability as the buyer to discover through independent investigation the market conditions that might affect its potential liability."3 7
There is no equivalent need for limiting the buyer's recovery when the
seller's liability is greater than expected due to its failure to discover
such conditions. If the seller were allowed expansive relief when the
buyer failed to disclose such equal-access information, the buyer that

acquired the information through its own diligence would be induced
104. Most scholars justify Hadley on the ground that it promotes disclosure. See
supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
105. Professors Eisenberg and Johnston disagree with the premise that limiting the
buyer's recovery in the event of nondisclosure will efficiently promote disclosure.
Professor Eisenberg asserts that the cost of assembling and communicating the relevant information can exceed the expected value of communication and that sellers
frequently will not alter contract terms or the method of performance even when
there is disclosure. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 592-96, 605-06. Eisenberg's assertions
actually support the efficiency of a disclosure rule. In cases of marginally increased
risk of loss caused by complicated circumstances, perhaps the cost of communicating
such information will exceed the value of added protection resulting from disclosure.
In such cases the efficient buyer will not disclose. But in situations where the cost of
communication is exceeded by the added protection against the risk of monumental
losses, efficiency will be promoted through disclosure. And if the seller will not alter
its course of conduct in the event of disclosure, then it would be incumbent upon the
buyer to get added protection at no additional cost. Often the seller will want to take
special precautions against unusually large risks, however, and only disclosure will
allow the seller the opportunity to take those special precautions.
Professor Johnston contends that disclosure is not effectively promoted because
sellers have an incentive to convince buyers that the probability of breach is very low
and a convinced buyer will perceive little benefit in disclosing and paying a higher
price for protection against the risk of unusually large losses. Johnston, supra note 4,
at 632-33. There are several flaws in this analysis. First, while a risk of breach may be
low, the risk nonetheless exists. To avoid catastrophe, a reasonable buyer might prefer to pay a price for protection against that highly unlikely catastrophe. The existence of a thriving insurance industry demonstrates that individuals will pay to protect
themselves from the risk of low-probability catastrophes. Second, disclosure will not
necessarily result in an increase in price. The seller may simply take special precautions to avoid breach. Third, if the seller truly is a high-risk seller, then it may well
prefer to refuse to contract with a high-risk buyer rather than subject itself to a high
risk of great liability or may impose such restrictive or exorbitant terms as to encourage disclosing buyers to find another, more reliable seller.
106. Reasonably equal access to information does not mean that the parties will
achieve equal results through investigation. It means that both parties have enough
access so that it is fair to expect them to acquire the information through investigation
rather than relying on disclosure.
107. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosur Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1, 13-15 (1978).
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to disclose it to assure recovery, thereby denying the buyer its reward
for diligence and reducing the incentive for the seller to investigate
accessible information. 10 8
7.

Limiting Liability Consistently With the Parties' Likely
Allocation of Risk

A contract involves an agreed allocation of risks. 10 9 Default rules
are imposed when the parties fail to expressly allocate particular
risks."' While default rules are properly influenced by relevant policy
concerns, they should also attempt to reflect how the parties would
likely have allocated risks had they expressly so provided."' Therefore, in formulating the default rule for consequential economic dam108. The buyer may have developed through its own efforts an information network through which it has sole access to relevant market conditions unknowable by
the seller. Because access to this information has arisen from the efforts of the buyer,
it would be unfair to force disclosure of such information. As a matter of policy, the
buyer should be allowed to retain the benefits of its diligence. Id.
109. Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Contract Law
4 (1979); Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in ContractDamages, 1992
Wis. L. Rev. 1755, 1772 (1992) ("Contract law revolves around agreements among
parties allocating the risks of a business transaction.").
Viewing a contract as risk allocation indicates that the price term is the most basic
form of risk allocation and that pricing can serve as an indicator of how parties might
have allocated other risks. H. Ward Classen, JudicialIntervention in ContractualRelationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Common Law, 42 S.C. L. Rev.
379, 416 (1991).
110. Default rules in contract law have been analogized to the default settings on a
computer:
Recently... the rhetoric of gap-filling has been increasingly supplanted by a
new and powerful heuristic device: the concept of default rules. . . . The
default rule approach analogizes the way that contract law fills gaps in the
expressed consent of contracting parties to the way that word-processing
programs set our margins for us in the absence of our expressly setting them
for ourselves. A word-processing program that required us to set every variable needed to write a page of text would be more trouble than it was worth.
Instead, all word-processing programs provide default settings for such variables as margins, type fonts, and line spacing and leave it to the user to
change any of these default settings to better suit his or her purposes.
Barnett, supra note 12, at 823-24.
111. "A default rule is applied when the parties' contract is silent, and resolves
disputes according to the contract that most well-informed persons would have
adopted if they were to bargain about the matter." Schwartz, supra note 84, at 361; see
also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, ContractualFreedom in Corporate
Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416, 1433 (1989) ("The gap-filling rule will call on courts to
duplicate the term the parties would have selected, in their joint interest if they had
contracted explicitly."); Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 627-28; Andrew Kull, Mistake,
Frustration,and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 Hastings L.J. 1, 43
(1991) ("The standard approach to the choice of default rules recommends that they
be those the parties of a typical contract would be most likely to select for
themselves.").
By choosing default rules to reflect the parties' likely intent, the parties are relieved
of the burden of contracting around the rules. Posner, supra note 64, at 68 (arguing
that default rules should economize on transaction costs by supplying the terms that
the parties would otherwise have adopted by agreement).
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ages it is appropriate to consider how the parties, bargaining
1 13
reasonably, 1 2 would allocate risk with respect to those damages.
On the question of relief from liability for consequential economic
damages, the parties do not perceive their interests to be in common.
The seller, being the only party likely to be liable for such damages,' 14
would favor expansive relief from liability while the buyer would
favor no relief. In such a situation of divergent interests, it must be
assumed that the contracting parties, bargaining fairly and reasonably,
would compromise. The point of compromise would vary depending
on whether the unexpected damages were the result of undisclosed

special circumstances, changed market conditions, or intentionally or
willfully inefficient breach.
The seller has a compelling reason to insist on relief from liability
for consequential economic losses when the buyer has failed to dis-

close its special circumstances, thereby preventing the seller from accurately assessing its risk of liability in the event of breach. 15 Without
this information," 6 the seller is deprived of the ability to take specific
protective measures" 7 when dealing with high risk buyers. To prevent
liability that was unexpected due to the buyer's nondisclosure, it can
be assumed that at the seller's insistence the parties would compromise in a manner that would afford the seller expansive relief from its
mistaken risk assessment by substantially limiting the buyer's recovery
for consequential economic losses." 8
Professors Ayres and Gertner have persuasively argued that the imputed intent of
the parties should not be the sole criterion because penalty defaults, which by definition give to one party what the other party did not want to give, may be appropriate
to further legitimate social or economic ends. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 97100.
112. "[W]hat would have been rational for the parties ex ante is extremely strong
evidence of the terms to which they would have agreed." Jules L. Coleman et al., A
BargainingTheory Approach to Default Provisionsand Disclosure Rules in Contract
Law, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 639, 645 (1989). "Since the object of most voluntary
exchanges is to increase value or efficiency, contracting parties may be assumed to
desire a set of contract terms that will maximize the value of the exchange." Richard
A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud. 83, 89 (1977).
113. When parties choose to define the scope of their liability they are free within
policy limits such as unconscionability to do so. When the parties are silent regarding
the extent of liability, a default rule must supply the terms of that liability.
114. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
116. The seller can obtain information concerning the buyer's special circumstances
only through the buyer's disclosure because the seller lacks independent access to it.
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
117. If the seller acquires such information, it can protect itself by declining to
enter the contract, increasing the price, limiting its liability by contract or taking special precautions to avoid breach.
118. The precise manner in which reasonable parties would allocate these losses is
not capable of accurate determination. The point at which the seller will be relieved
of liability must therefore be based not on allocation of risk alone but on a consideration of all relevant policies.
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Conversely, the seller has little reason to insist on relief from liability when its breach is intentionally or willfully inefficient. In this situation, it is appropriate to presume that the parties, at the buyer's
insistence, would compromise by allowing the buyer expansive recovery for all economic losses.
In cases that fall between these two extremes, involving neither the
buyer's nondisclosure nor the seller's intentionally or willfully inefficient breach, it is likely that the parties' compromise as to the scope of
liability would occupy a middle ground, because there is a dichotomy
between the buyer's interest in expansive recovery for unexpected
losses and the seller's interest in limiting liability for such losses.' 19
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO HADLEY. A SITUATIONAL APPROACH
TO LIABILITY

A. Introduction
The above described policies are not in complete harmony and cannot be equally accommodated in all situations. Some are promoted by
expansive liability, while others are promoted by limited liability. The
policies of compensating the victim of breach, deterring inefficient
breach and promoting the reliability of contract are all furthered by
subjecting the seller to expansive liability for unexpected losses. The
policies of reducing subsidization of loss, promoting predictability and
encouraging disclosure of information concerning the buyer's special
circumstances, however, are furthered by substantially limiting the
buyer's recovery for unexpected economic losses. The relevance of,
and the weight to be afforded to, these policies in determining the
scope of the seller's liability depend upon the circumstances surrounding the formation and breach of the contract. For example, the seller's
commission of an intentionally or willfully inefficient breach directly
conflicts with the policy of deterring such breaches, and therefore the
need to promote deterrence through expansive liability is especially
important in such a situation. But if the breach was not intentionally
or willfully inefficient, the need to promote deterrence through expansive liability is not a matter of concern. By way of further example, if
119. The dichotomy of interest between the seller and buyer in the context of consequential damages does not exist in the context of general damages, obviating the
need for a compromise. It is in both parties' interests to allow full recovery for general damages. The purpose of general damages is, interalia, to compensate the victim
of breach for fluctuations in the market, allowing it to obtain equivalent goods or
services without ultimately paying more than the contract price. The need for such
protection is applicable to all buyers and sellers irrespective of their special circumstances and stems from the fact that a primary purpose of entering into a contract is to
eliminate the risk of post-formation fluctuations in the market price for the goods,
property or services covered by the contract. Because this need is fundamental and is
shared equally by both parties, it is appropriate to assume that, unlike consequential
damages, full compensation for general damages was intended irrespective of the extent to which such damages were unanticipated.
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the buyer fails to disclose its special circumstances to the seller at the
time of the contract formation, the policy of encouraging such disclosure has special relevance, justifying substantial limitation of the
buyer's recovery. In cases of full disclosure, however, this policy
should not be a factor in limiting the extent of the seller's liability.
Because different situations emphasize different policies, a single,
invariable standard of liability is inappropriate. As an alternative, a
flexible standard with three levels of liability is proposed. The applicable level of liability would depend upon the type of case. In those
cases where the buyer has failed to disclose at the time of the contract
formation the special circumstances concerning the extent of its potential loss in the event of breach, the seller's liability would be most
limited, and it would be liable only for those consequential economic
losses that it should have known were the probable result of breach.
In cases where the seller has committed an intentionally or willfully
inefficient breach, the seller's liability would be most expansive, and it
would be liable for those losses that it should have known were a significantly possible result of breach. In all other cases, an intermediate
level of liability would apply, and the seller would be liable for those
losses that it should have known were a normal result of breach.
B.

The ProbabilityStandard

The buyer's recovery should be most limited in cases where, prior to
the formation of the contract, the buyer failed to disclose its special
circumstances to the seller. The term "special circumstances" refers to
information known by the buyer that differentiates the buyer's vulnerability to economic loss on account of breach from that of other buyers and is of such significance that disclosure might reasonably have
induced the seller to take additional protective measures in response.12° It is proposed that a nondisclosing buyer's recovery should
be limited to those consequential economic losses that were a probable result of breach.' 2 ' Losses would be considered probable if, at
120. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
121. It could be argued that subjecting the seller to any liability at all for consequential economic damages is unfair in a case of material nondisclosure because, had
there been disclosure, the seller might have avoided liability altogether by taking ad-

ditional protective measures. The purpose for requiring disclosure of material information, however, is not to protect the seller against risks of which it should already be

aware, but to allow the seller to take protective measures against the risks concealed
by nondisclosure. By limiting the seller's liability in the event of nondisclosure to

those damages against which it was already especially alerted to take protective measures (i.e., probable damages), the probability standard satisfies the purpose underlying the disclosure requirement.

It could also be argued that, because the seller is in breach, denying recovery for
consequential economic damages inappropriately punishes the buyer, but this is not
the case. Because the buyer has denied the seller the opportunity to take protective
measures that might have avoided liability, it is appropriate to limit the buyer's recovery in response.
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the time of the creation of the contract, the seller should have known
that they were more likely than not to result from breach. 22
An example of a situation covered by this standard would occur
when the buyer fails to disclose to the seller that if delivery of goods is
not precisely on the date provided by the contract the buyer will lose a
substantial resale profit. Disclosure might reasonably have induced
the seller to take protective measures in response-either by refusing
to enter into the contract, by contractually limiting liability for consequential damages, by increasing the price to this buyer, or by taking
special precautions to assure timely delivery. The buyer's damages for
lost profits caused by late delivery would be limited to those that the
seller should have known were a probable result of breach. If such
loss were so typical in the industry that disclosure could not reasonably be expected to cause the seller to take additional precautions,
however, the undisclosed information would not constitute special circumstances, and therefore the probability standard would not apply.
By imposing severe limitations on the nondisclosing buyer's recovery, the probability standard would promote the policy of encouraging
disclosure of the buyer's special circumstances relevant to the consequences of breach."' This standard would reduce subsidization of
loss by the buying public by allowing the seller to differentiate among
its buyers and individualize its responses according to the particular
risks presented, and to charge the highest prices to the buyers presenting the highest risk, thereby reducing the need for generalized risk
shifting. 24 Furthermore, by apprising the seller of the risk of expansive liability in the event of breach, disclosure would frequently induce
the seller either to forego the contract, limit liability for consequential
economic damages, or take effective precautions to avoid breach, all
of which would reduce liability and thereby reduce subsidization. 125
Even if buyers fail to disclose their special circumstances, subsidization would still be reduced because of the substantially reduced liability that would follow, thereby lowering the cost that would be passed
on to the buying public.
The probability standard would also promote predictability 26 by relieving the seller from liability for unexpected losses, thereby avoiding
inefficiency and waste 127 by obviating the need for the seller to pre122. Some case law has defined a "probable" result to mean something less likely
than the statistically "more likely than not" standard adopted herein. See cases cited
supra note 24. These more lenient standards are rejected because when the buyer
fails to disclose its special circumstances the more demanding standard is necessary to
promote the relevant policies mentioned in the textual discussion of the probability
standard.
123. See supra part I.B.6.
124. See supra part II.B.4.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
126. See supra part II.B.5.
127. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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pare for speculative contingencies. Furthermore, this standard would

limit liability consistent with the parties' likely allocation of risk in
that parties bargaining fairly and reasonably would likely agree that
the seller's liability for unexpected loss caused by the buyer's failure
to disclose its special circumstances should be substantially limited.12a
This standard would impose no burden on the buyer to disclose in-

formation that does not pertain to its special circumstances, such as
information concerning market conditions. If the buyer acquires
knowledge of information through its own diligence, not pertaining to
its special circumstances and to which the seller therefore had relatively equal access, imposing the probability standard for nondisclosure of such information would thwart the incentive for diligence.

29

Even if undisclosed information pertained to the buyer's circumstances, there would be no burden of disclosure unless the information
was material, that is, it so increased the apparent magnitude of the
buyer's potential loss in the event of breach that, had the information
been disclosed, the seller might reasonably have been expected to
take additional protective measures in response. 13 Limiting disclosure to such information would allow the seller a reasonable opportu-

nity to take protective measures against high-risk buyers without
imposing on buyers the undue and
inefficient burden of disclosing ap13
parently irrelevant information.
For the same reason, this standard would not apply when, from the

nature of the transaction or the information disclosed by the buyer, a
reasonable seller would have been aware of the buyer's special cir128. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
130. Under this standard, disclosure would be required if the information was "material" as that term is generally defined in a nondisclosure context. See, eg., Basics,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (applied to nondisclosure under § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1976) (applied to nondisclosure under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applied to
nondisclosure in cases of negligent failure of a physician to obtain patient's informed
consent), cerLt. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Van
Schaack, 867 P.2d 892, 899 (Colo. 1994) (applied to nondisclosure in cases of breach
of fiduciary duty).
The United States Supreme Court explained the meaning of the term "material" in
the context of disclosure of material information to shareholder investors:
It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the
omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.
What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood
that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449.
131. If buyers' recovery were limited because of nondisclosure of immaterial information, buyers might bury sellers "in an avalanche of trivial information-a result
that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. at 448-49.
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cumstances without disclosure by the buyer. 132 For example, if the
buyer, whom the seller knows to be a wholesaler, has contracted for
custom manufactured goods not otherwise available on the market,
the seller should be aware from that information alone that nondelivery would cause a loss of resale profits to the buyer. Because the
seller should already have been aware that the buyer would suffer
these losses, the buyer's failure to disclose that it would lose profits in
the event1 33 of nondelivery should not invoke the probability
standard.

It has been suggested that incentives for disclosure serve no practical purpose because sellers do not respond to information even when
it is disclosed. 3 The proposed standard takes this theory into consideration because, if it can be established that a reasonable seller would
132. Alternatively stated, in order for the buyer to avoid the constraints of the
probability standard, the seller must have "reason to know" of the buyer's special
circumstances.
"Reason to know" means that the actor has knowledge of facts from which a
reasonable man.., would either infer the existence of the fact in question or
would regard its existence as so highly probable that his conduct would be
predicated upon the assumption that the fact did exist.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12 cmt. a (1965). See also Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 9 cmt. d (1958) ("A person has reason to know of a fact if he has information from which a person of ordinary intelligence ... would infer that the fact in
question exists or that there is such a substantial chance of its existence that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, his action would be
predicated upon the assumption of its possible existence."); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 19 cmt. b (1979) ("A person has reason to know a fact ... if he has
information from which a person of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in
question does or will exist."); U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(c) (1990) ("A person has 'notice' of
a fact when . . . from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in
question he has reason to know that it exists."). It is to be distinguished from the term
"should know" in that the latter imposes a duty of due care to inquire as to the true
state of facts, which "reason to know" does not impose. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 12 cmt. a (1965).
133. The seller is imputed with knowledge of the buyer's circumstances if a reasonable seller would have been aware of them. For example, if a seller of hardware
knows that the buyer is a wholesaler of hardware, the seller cannot invoke the
probability standard on the ground that the buyer failed to disclose its intention to
resell the hardware. From this perspective there are two kinds of special circumstances: those that the seller can be deemed to know and those that must be disclosed
by the buyer. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) draws a similar distinction between "general" and
"particular" needs of the buyer. Under that provision the seller is liable for "any loss
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the
time of contracting had reason to know." Under § 2-715(2)(a) only unique or particular needs of the buyer need to be disclosed to charge the seller. U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 3
(1990). The seller is imputed with knowledge of the buyer's general needs. U.C.C.
§ 2-715 cmt. 3 (1990); Anderson, supra note 12, at 355. Comment 6 to § 2-715 provides an example of a general need of the buyer that can be charged to the seller: "In
the case of sale of wares to one in the business of reselling them, resale is one of the
requirements of which the seller has reason to know within the meaning of subsection
(2)(a)." U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 6 (1990).
134. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 592-96, 605-06 (discussing how the cost of
processing the information can exceed the benefits to the seller).
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not have taken additional protective measures had there been disclosure, the probability standard would not apply.
The proposed standard would apply only when the buyer has

knowledge of its special circumstances. In most cases the buyer would
know its own special circumstances, but it is possible that the buyer
would not. 135 For example, the buyer may be unaware that a defect in
ordered operating equipment that is innocuous to most buyers would
result in a shutdown of this buyer's operation. The threat of expansive
liability would not induce the buyer to disclose these special circumstances because it136is unaware of them. To limit the impact of this
"penalty default"'
rule to cases where disclosure would be clearly

promoted by expansive liability, the probability standard would not
apply when the buyer is unaware of the special circumstances. 7
Because the purpose of disclosure is to allow the seller the opportunity to select from among the full panoply of protective measures,138
the standard would require the buyer's disclosure prior to the contract

formation to avoid the probability standard.1 39 Unless disclosure is
made prior to the contract, the seller would be denied the opportunity
1 40

to contractually limit liability, raise the price or decline the contract.
If the buyer could avoid the probability standard by post-formation
disclosure, the incentive for pre-formation disclosure would be
eliminated.

When this standard applies, determining whether the seller should
have known that the buyer's consequential economic losses would be
135. Theoretically the seller could ascertain the buyer's special circumstances by
asking the buyer. To impose such a burden of inquiry on the seller would require it in
every contract to engage in a fishing expedition to protect itself from unexpected
liability. It would be more efficient for the buyer, who knows the relevant information concerning its special circumstances, to disclose that information rather than for
the seller to engage the buyer in an unfocused and frequently fruitless inquiry. Such a
burden of inquiry merely imposes an unnecessary and inappropriate precondition to
the buyer's disclosure. By the same token, in determining what information to disclose, the buyer could theoretically inquire of the seller as to whether particular information would have a significant impact on the seller's risk assessment. To impose
such a burden of inquiry on the buyer would require a fishing expedition as inefficient
and inappropriate as the seller's burden.
136. Ayres and Gertner coined the phrase "penalty default" to describe a rule that
would encourage desired conduct or discourage undesired conduct by use of a penalty. An example would be a rule of liability for consequential damages that seeks to
encourage disclosure of information by reducing recovery for nondisclosure. Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 4, at 97-104.
137. A party is far more likely to be deterred when it is aware of the operative facts
as compared to when, as a reasonable person, he or she should have been aware. See
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
139. The probability standard would not apply when the buyer fails to disclose special circumstances that arose subsequent to the formation of the contract. To impose
post-formation burdens on the buyer is inconsistent with principles of contract law in
which rights and obligations are created by the contract, not by subsequent events.
140. The only protective measure remaining available to the seller after the formation of the contract is to take additional precautions to avoid breach.
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a probable result of breach 14 1 should be based on information available to the seller at the time of the formation of the contract. The
probability standard encourages disclosure at a time when the seller
can take appropriate, responsive measures. 142 In determining whether
the seller should have known that the buyer's losses would be a probable result of breach, therefore, information disclosed by the buyer
after the formation of the contract would not be considered. Otherwise, the incentive for pre-formation disclosure would be eliminated,
and the value of the probability standard would be negated.
The probability standard would not restrict the buyer's recovery if,
from the nature of the transaction or from the buyer's limited disclosure, the seller already knew or should have known that the buyer's
loss would be a probable result of breach. Such a situation could occur if the undisclosed risk failed to materialize, and the buyer suffered
losses that most buyers in similar circumstances could be expected to
suffer. The seller should not be protected from liability arising from
risks against which it should already have taken precautions.
It is true, of course, that the probability standard, by denying recovery for unexpected consequential economic losses, would frequently
result in less than full compensation to the buyer, 1 43 and thus would
undermine the reliability of contracts.' 4 The impact of this result,
however, is mitigated because the buyer can circumvent this limitation
on its recovery by disclosing relevant information and because the
buyer's recovery of general damages, personal injury or property
damages will not be altered. Furthermore, to the extent the
probability standard induces disclosure, the policies of fully compensating the buyer and promoting reliability of contracts will be promoted because sellers will be induced to take special precautions to
avoid breach.
Limiting liability in the manner proposed will not significantly undermine the policy of deterring breach. 145 Because the seller will be
unaware prior to breach of the buyer's failure to disclose material information, the seller will not make a decision to breach based on the
141. For the buyer's losses to be deemed the probable result of breach, the focus
should be upon the particular transaction at issue. If probability were measured from
a global perspective by the cumulative likelihood that such a loss would occur once
among all of the seller's contracts, then for high volume sellers most losses would be
probable and the standard would become meaningless. For example, assume a buyer
has failed to disclose material information to a high volume seller resulting in the
imposition of the probability standard. If the buyer suffered unusual losses, it should
be denied recovery for those losses even though, among all of the seller's customers,
at least one of them would probably suffer damages in such an amount.
142. After the formation of the contract the seller can no longer take the protective
measures of altering contract terms, raising the price or declining to contract. It can
still take steps to assure performance even after the contract has been formed.
143. See supra part II.B.1.
144. See supra part II.B.3.
145. See supra part II.B.2.
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assumption that its liability will be limited to probable losses. Furthermore, the seller will remain motivated to perform by nonlegal
sanctions, such as competitive market pressures, 4 6 and by its full liability for general damages' 47 and expansive liability for consequential
personal injury and property damages proximately caused by the
breach. 148
C. The Significant Possibility Standard
The seller's liability should be least limited when it commits a will1 49
fully inefficient breach because it engaged in a course of conduct
Under the
that it knew would likely result in an inefficient breach.'
that
the
buyer's
propose
the
authors
standard,
significant possibility
recovery for inefficient breach should include all consequential economic loss resulting from breach where its occurrence was a significant possibility. 151 Loss would be considered a significant possibility if,
at the time of its breach, 52 the seller should have known that the occurrence of that loss would not be so extraordinary as to be extremely
unusual. The term "significant possibility" is intended to encompass
loss approaching that covered by the foreseeability standard of tort
law.' 53 The term "foreseeability" is not used to define this standard
because in contract 54law it has become inextricably intertvined with
the rule of Hadley.
The significant possibility standard would include cases of late delivery, as for example when the seller, knowing that the buyer needs
immediate delivery to avoid a shutdown of operations, intentionally
chooses an inexpensive method of shipment and declines a more relia146. "[N]onlegal sanctions-particularly the manufacturer's reputation in consumer markets-are the major determinant of the manufacturer's adherence to commitments to maintain product quality above minimal standards." David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 375, 394 (1990).
See generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1981). See also Thomas M. Palay,
ComparativeInstitutionalEconomics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting,13
J. Legal Stud. 265, 275 (1984) (noting the incentive posed by possible future businesses on conduct); Ulen, supra note 51, at 347 ("The most important nonlegal market force is probably reputation.").
147. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
149. The course of conduct covered by this standard would include omission as well

as commission.
150. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
151. For the buyer's losses to be deemed a significantly possible result of breach,
the focus should be upon the particular transaction at issue. If the determination of
whether the buyer's losses were a significant possibility were measured from a global
perspective by reference to whether such a loss could occur among all of the seller's
buyers, then for high-volume sellers virtually all losses would be significantly possible
and the standard would be the equivalent of absolute liability.
152. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 47.
154. See supra notes 26 and 35 and accompanying text.
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ble method, knowing that its choice will likely result in late delivery
and that the savings from late delivery will likely be less than the
buyer's losses. The standard would include breaches of warranty
caused by the seller's deliberate failure to institute efficient quality
controls. It would also include cases of nondelivery. For example, assume a raisin grower in California has a contract to deliver its output
of raisins to a commercial buyer, knowing the buyer intends to resell
them. Further assume that because of the ongoing effects of a
draught, the market price of raisins has increased since the formation
of the contract. To take advantage of this increase, the grower, in
breach of contract, sells its supply to other purchasers at the increased
price, knowing that the buyer's cost to purchase substitute raisins will
at least equal the grower's profits from the breach.155 Subsequently
the buyer learns of the grower's breach, but because the supply of
raisins has dried up as a result of the continuing draught, the buyer is
unable to contract for substitute raisins. While the evaporation of the
supply of raisins was not a probable or even a normal consequence of
breach when measured at the time of the formation of the contract, it
was a significantly possible result at the time of breach and therefore
the grower would be liable for the buyer's lost resale profits.'5 6
The significant possibility standard is designed to deter, through expansive liability, conduct that is economically unjustifiable because it
is willfully inefficient. 57 This standard seeks to accomplish this goal in
a narrowly confined manner consistent with the underlying policies. It
is limited to conduct that can readily be deterred through the imposition of expansive liability. The threat of expansive liability will increase the incentive to perform, which is all that is necessary to avoid
the breaches covered by this standard, as they stem from a conscious
decision to breach. Because the breaches covered by this standard are
limited to those that the seller knows will likely result from its conduct, the seller knows what conduct to change in order to avoid

155.
156.
Victor
157.

This is a clear example of an inefficient breach. See supra note 64.
The facts of the hypothetical are borrowed from Sun Maid Raisin Growers v.
Packing Co., 194 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1983).
It could be argued that unlimited liability should be adopted to deter such

conduct. Even when conduct is so reprehensible as to be tortious, however, unlimited

liability is not applied. See supra note 47. Unlimited liability could have potentially
devastating effects on the buying public and on commerce.
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breach. 158 This "penalty default" rule15 9 would thereby be limited to
situations in which deterrence would be especially effective. 1"
This proposed standard would promote the reliability of contracts

either by discouraging breach, and thereby assuring full performance,
or, in the event of breach, by putting the aggrieved party, except in
extraordinary circumstances, in the same position as if the contract
was performed. The correlative is that this standard would most fully
compensate the victim. The proposed standard would expand liability
consistently with the parties likely allocation of risk; parties bargaining fairly and reasonably can be assumed, at the buyer's insistence, to
have intended that the seller who knowingly committed an inefficient
breach would be subject to expansive liability.

It is true that the imposition of expansive liability carries the risk of
increased subsidization by the buying public. By limiting the significant possibility standard to breaches that can readily be deterred,
however, it is more likely that subsidization by the buying public
would be decreased rather than increased. Liability under this standard, by allowing recovery for all but extremely unusual losses, would
undermine, to some extent, the policy of promoting predictability.
This negative impact, however, is substantially outweighed by the positive results achieved by applying this standard to willfully inefficient
breach.
The determination of whether the buyer's losses were a significantly

possible result of breach should be based on information available to
158. A rule that deters conduct where the party to be deterred is aware of the
negative consequences that will flow from its conduct is far more likely to be effective
as a deterrent than a rule that seeks to deter conduct where the party should know,
but does not know, of those consequences. The premise that rules can deter conduct
is based upon
a series of behavioral hypotheses that must all be correct before imposition
of tort liability will achieve the predicted results: typical actors must know
the liability rules associated with various forms of conduct; they must possess
sufficient information and evaluative skills to assess potential risks; they
must pay attention to risks and corresponding liability rules when they engage in risky activities; and the category of actors assigned liability must
evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative choices in a meaningful manner. In short, liability rules will promote social engineering objectives only to
the extent that prospective injurers and victims can, and typically do, undertake informed problem-solving behavior with respect to the risks for which
they may be liable.
Latin, supra note 73, at 678 (footnote omitted).
By limiting the significant possibility standard to cases in which the seller knows
that its conduct will likely result in an inefficient breach, most of the above-mentioned
hypotheses will exist before the rule will apply. The seller wil possess sufficient information to assess the consequences of its conduct and will possess sufficient evaluative
skills to engage in that assessment because it will in fact have made the assessment
that the likely value of its conduct is outweighed by the likely harm. See supra note 73.
159. See supra note 136.
160. See supra note 158.
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the seller at the time of the breach. 161 This timing would modify the
prevailing approach that invariably measures consequential economic
damages by information reasonably available to the seller at the time
of the formation of the contract. 162 Because the breaches covered
under the significant possibility standard are willful and, therefore,
can be avoided by the seller's conscious decision to perform, the seller
retains the ability until the time of breach to respond to new riskrelated information and protect itself by choosing to perform. Measuring the scope of liability from this period of time is similar to the
approach imposed under the foreseeability standard of tort law, which
measures foreseeability at the time of breach of duty. 63 Both approaches are intended to accomplish similar objectives-to afford
broad compensation to the injured victim and to deter inefficient and
reprehensible conduct. 64
Were it not for the economic loss doctrine of tort law, 165 the conduct that would subject the seller to expansive lability under the significant possibility standard would also subject it to liability for
compensatory and punitive damages under tort law. The seller, by
engaging in conduct that it knew would likely result in an inefficient
breach, acted so unreasonably as to be both negligent 166 and reck161. Professor Eisenberg has suggested a unitary, inflexible rule that would always
apply the tort foreseeability standard in determining consequential damages and
would in all cases measure foreseeability from the time of breach. See Eisenberg,
supra note 4, at 599-600.
162. According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: "A contracting party is
generally expected to take account of those risks that are foreseeable at the time he
makes the contract. He is not, however, liable in the event of breach for loss that he
did not at the time of contracting have reason to foresee as a probable result of such a
breach." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351(1) cmt. a (1979).
The U.C.C. makes the seller liable only for those consequential losses arising from
requirements and needs of which the seller had reason to know "at the time of contracting." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1990).
163. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bender, 369 N.E.2d 936, 939-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977);
Gibbs v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 629 So. 2d 437, 442 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Duvall
v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Park v. Hoffard, 826 P.2d 79, 82
(Or. Ct. App. 1992); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd.,
1961 A.C. 388 (Austl. P.C. 1961).
164. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. The rationale for the economic
loss doctrine has been stated succinctly by the United States Supreme Court: "The
increased cost to the public that would result from holding a manufacturer liable in
tort for ... [purely economic losses] is not justified." East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986).
166. If the defendant knows or should know that its conduct is subjecting others to
an unreasonable risk of harm, because the magnitude of the risk outweighs its utility,
its conduct is negligent. See, e.g., Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 356 (Colo. 1992);
Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 742 P.2d 377, 380 (Haw. 1987); Patton v.
Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1310 (Kan. 1993); Goza v. Cornwell,
622 So. 2d 704, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 762
(Mich. 1977); Lunar v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 572 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989); Edco Prod., Inc. v. Hernandez, 794 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Wyo. 1992); see also Restatement (Sec-
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less. 1 6 7 Tort law imposes more expansive liability for reckless misconduct than for negligent misconduct because recklessness is recognized
as more reprehensible and more readily deterrable than simple negligence. 168 The fact that the economic loss doctrine relegates such conduct to contractual sanctions when it results in purely economic loss
does not mean that expansive liability must be precluded. It only
means that tort law would not apply, and therefore the seller would
not be sanctioned with punitive damages. 16 9 Further, the seller may
avoid liability with a disclaimer clause 170 or because of the absence of
ond) of Torts §§ 289, 291 (1965) (stating that actor must use care of a reasonable
person in assessing whether "the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the
law regards as the utility of the act"); Keeton et al, supra note 37, § 31 (defining
negligence as conduct which involves an "unreasonably great risk of causing damage"); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 29 (1972)
("Negligence-the failure to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent and careful
man-has been the dominant standard of civil liability... for the last 150 years or so
In the cases covered by the significant possibility standard, the seller actually knows
that its conduct is subjecting the buyer to an unreasonable risk of harm because it
knows that the risk (the likely loss to the buyer) outweighs the utility (the likely gain
to the seller).
167. Most cases under state common law, although varying in their precise
terminology, have adopted more or less the same rule, recognizing that punitive damages in tort cases may be awarded not only for actual intent to injure or evil motive, but also for recklessness, serious indifference to or
disregard for the rights of others, or even gross negligence.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1983).
In the cases covered by the significant possibility standard, the seller has exhibited
an indifference to and disregard for the rights of the buyer in that the seller was aware
that its conduct would likely result in an unjustifiable breach.
168. In tort law, the expansive liability for such reckless conduct takes the form of
punitive damages. See supra note 45.
169. See supra note 45.
170. In tort law, disclaimers of liability may be invalid as a matter of law. For example, the majority of courts hold that sellers' disclaimers from strict products liability are invalid. See Haynes v. Kleinewefers & Lembo Corp., 921 F.2d 453,458 (2d Cir.
1990); Weiner v. Mt. Airy Lodge, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 342, 346 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Pratt &
Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1180 (Alaska 1993); Westlye v. Look
Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781,799 (Ct. App. 1993); Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613
N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993); Elite Professionals, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 827
P.2d 1195, 1201 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec.

Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Wash. 1989); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 402A, cmt. m (1965) (stating that a consumer's tort cause of action is not affected by
any disclaimer or other agreement).
In sales law, disclaimers of liability are permitted under U.C.C. § 2-719, whereby
remedies may be limited unless the limitation is unconscionable (U.C.C. § 2-719(3))
or unless the limitation fails of its essential purpose (U.C.C. § 2-719(2)). See generally
Jonathan A. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposesof Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 Calif. L. Rev. 28, 28 (1977) (finding that "a 'talismanic' approach, focusing more on the form of a limited remedy than on its intended
purpose, characterizes the current case law dealing with section 2-719(2)"); Howard
Foss, When to Apply the Doctrine of Failure of Essential Purposeto an Exclusion of
Consequential Damages: An Objective Approad, 25 Duquesne L Rev. 551, 594
(1987) (concluding that the problem of when to apply the doctrine "is best resolved
by a consideration of the objective facts and circumstances").
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privity of contract. 17 1 Expansive liability under contract theory for
breaches that are not only negligent, but coupled with malice, should
be imposed to deter conduct that is so wrongful as to be reprehensible
and to allow broad compensation to the victim.
If the buyer failed to disclose its special circumstances to the seller
and therefore would otherwise be subject to the probability standard,
the significant possibility standard would apply when the seller engaged in a course of conduct that it knew would likely result in an
inefficient breach. If, even without the buyer's disclosure, the seller
knew its breach would be inefficient, it should not be exempted from
expansive liability under the significant possibility standard when it
engaged in reprehensible and economically unjustifiable conduct. Absolving the buyer from the constraints of the probability standard in
such a situation would not discourage disclosure because the buyer, at
the time of the contract formation, cannot reasonably assume that the
seller will thereafter commit a willfully inefficient breach that would
permit the buyer expansive recovery despite nondisclosure.
Expanding liability when the breach is willful is not a novel concept
in contract law. For example, in cases involving willful breach of warranty in service and construction contracts, courts have frequently
stated that the damages for such breach are the cost of repairs even
though they exceed the diminution in value and even though awarding
such damages would entail economic waste.' 72 In cases involving
nonwillful breach of warranty in service and construction contracts,
however, diminution in value is the ceiling on recovery if the awarding
of repair costs would entail economic waste. 173 The dichotomy of
treatment between willful and nonwillful breaches has not met with
171. "The requirement of privity in negligence actions, an unfortunate amalgam of
tort and contract principles, was for the most part laid to rest by Justice Cardozo's
famous opinion in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916), and we are not disposed to resurrect it ...

."

Clark v. International Harvester

Co., 581 P.2d 784, 794 (Idaho 1978). See also Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 473
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956); Johnson v. Equipment Specialists, Inc.,
373 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Ky.
1973); Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist., 734 P.2d 1326,1329 (Or. 1987). See generally
Mark A. Kaprelian, Note, Privity Revisited: Tort Recovery by a Commercial Buyer for
a Defective Product's Self-Inflicted Damage, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 517, 539 (1985) (concluding that "[s]trict tort liability should apply only when the buyer and seller are not
in privity").
In contract law, however, the absence of privity may be a bar to the recovery of
consequential economic damages. See infra note 197.
172. See Haden v. Krupp Asset Management Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1151, 1157 (S.D.
Miss. 1990); Shell v. Schmidt, 330 P.2d 817, 825 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Kangas v.
Trust, 441 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286
N.W. 235, 236-38 (Minn. 1939); Kaiser v. Fishman, 525 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872 (App. Div.
1988); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Stool, 607 S.W.2d 17,22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980); see also
5 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1089 (1964); Hal J. Perloff, The EconomicWaste Doctrine in Government ContractLitigation,43 DePaul L. Rev. 185, 199 (1993).
173. See sources cited supra note 172.
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general approval. 74 This is understandable when the dichotomy of
treatment promotes economic waste, which is manifestly inconsistent
with the policies underlying the recovery of damages for breach of
contract. 175 The standard proposed herein seeks to avoid this pitfall
by imposing expansive liability only when the seller knew that its conduct would likely result in inefficient breach. Thus, the proposed standard is designed to avoid, not promote, economic waste by deterring
inefficient breaches.
D. The Intermediate Standard
The intermediate standard is the residual standard that would apply
in all cases not covered by the probability or the significant possibility
standard. It applies when the buyer has disclosed its special circumstances prior to the formation of the contract and the seller has not
committed a willfully inefficient breach. In cases covered by this standard, the seller would be liable for losses that at the time of the formation of the contract it should have known would be a normal
consequence of breach.' 76 Under this standard, the term "normal"
encompasses losses that are not irregular or uncommon. It covers
losses where the likelihood of occurrence is conceptually halfway between the polar positions of the probability standard and the significant possibility standard.
The reasons for limited liability under the probability standard and
for expansive liability under the significant possibility standard are not
present in cases covered by the intermediate standard. The need to
substantially limit the buyer's recovery to encourage disclosure" 7 is
lacking, as is the need for the diametrically opposite response of expanding the seller's liability to deter willful inefficient breaches.17
Therefore, the scope of liability in this middle category of cases should
fall between the limits established under the probability and significant possibility standards.
Because no policy is of paramount importance in the situations covered by the intermediate standard, there is an evident conflict among
174. 3 Dobbs, supra note 13, § 12.19(1), at 441-42; Craswell, supra note 51, at 667;
Michael H. Cohen, Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faithand FairDealing as a Tor4 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1291, 1300-01 (1985); Kenneth
J. Goldberg, Note, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 653, 667-68
(1988).
175. See sources cited supra note 174; see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying
text.

176. "Normal" refers to loss that is normal for the particular buyer, not for all buyers. Whether the buyer's loss was a normal consequence of breach would be based on

information that the seller knew or should have known, including information concerning the buyer's special circumstances that was disclosed to the seller.
177. Cf supra text accompanying notes 102-05 (discussing probability standard example where encouraging disclosure is necessary).

178. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 157-60 (discussing significant possibility
standard where deterring inefficient breach is necessary).
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policies of relatively equal weight. Expansive liability will promote
the reliability of contracts 179 and afford full compensation to the
buyer,'180 but it will undermine the policies of promoting predictability' and reducing subsidization of loss by the buying public.', Restrictive liability will conversely promote predictability and reduce
subsidization while undermining reliability and full compensation to
the buyer. For these reasons a compromise between expansive liability and restrictive liability is in order. The intermediate standard
achieves such a compromise.
Under the intermediate standard, the buyer in most cases will be
able to recover all of its consequential economic losses. Only when
there have been significant post-formation changes in market conditions or in the buyer's special circumstances would the buyer's losses
not be a normal consequence of breach. In the absence of such
changes, the seller would have knowledge or notice of all facts necessary to accurately assess the buyer's loss in the event of breach, such
as knowledge of the buyer's special circumstances 83 and notice of relevant market conditions." Even when there have been significant
post-formation changes in the buyer's special circumstances or in market conditions, the buyer would still recover unless the changes that
occurred so impacted the buyer's losses that they no longer could be
regarded as a normal result of breach.' 8 5 For example, assume the
buyer contracted to purchase sugar from the seller for purposes of
resale to profit from a spot shortage in the local market, and the seller
through inadvertence delivered late. During the delay the spot
shortage was eliminated because other sellers delivered sugar into the
same market. The resultant drop in the price of sugar caused the
buyer to lose significant resale profits. Assuming the sugar market was
179. See supra part II.B.3.
180. See supra part II.B.1.
181. See supra part II.B.5.
182. See supra part II.B.4.
183. For the buyer to avoid the probability standard, the buyer must have disclosed
its special circumstances to the seller. Under the intermediate standard, therefore,
the seller will have actual knowledge of the buyer's special circumstances gained from
the buyer's disclosure.
184. The seller has notice of facts, such as existing market conditions, even if the
seller does not actually know those facts, as long as the seller should have known the
facts from the surrounding circumstances. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(c) (1990) (explaining that knowledge of surrounding circumstances may be sufficient for notice).
185. Although nondisclosure of information other than the buyer's needs and circumstances will not cause the probability standard to be invoked, there are circumstances where it would be prudent for the buyer to disclose such information. For
example, if the buyer is aware that market conditions will likely prevent the buyer
from recovering in the event of breach, and the seller should not reasonably be expected to be aware of that fact, it would be advisable for the buyer to disclose that
information if the failure to recover would result in greater than ordinary damages. If
the seller is made aware of that information, those damages would more likely have
appeared as an ordinary consequence of breach.
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volatile and that neither a drop nor an increase in the market price
was probable, the buyer nevertheless would be entitled under the intermediate standard to full compensation for its lost profits because a
drop in price
in the volatile sugar market was not uncommon or
1 86
abnormal.
Because the intermediate standard would allow full compensation
to the buyer in most cases, it would substantially promote the reliability of contracts. Further, the claims denied full recovery under this
standard would include those that are far greater than the norm, and
therefore disproportionately large,"8 and by denying such claims, subsidization of loss by the buying public would be substantially reduced.1" Moreover, the standard would promote the policy of
predictability by precluding relief for abnormal and thus unpredictable losses.' 8 9 Finally, the intermediate standard, by occupying a middle ground, most closely approaches how the parties, with a
dichotomy of interests, bargaining fairly and reasonably, would likely
have allocated the risk of loss."9
Determining whether the buyer's losses were the normal result of
breach should be based on the information available to the seller at
the time of the formation of the contact. 191 The policy reasons that
justify determining whether the buyer's losses were a significant possibility as of the time of its breach are not present in cases covered by
the intermediate standard. To promote the policies served by this
standard, determining whether losses were a normal result of breach
should be evaluated when the seller can still select among its full panoply of protective measures.
E. The Nature of Loss: Type or Amount
In determining whether the buyer's loss was the probable, normal
or significantly possible result of breach, the focus should be on the
amount of, rather than the type of, the buyer's loss. As long as the
186. The example is based on the celebrated English House of Lords case Koufos v.
Czarnikow, Ltd. (The Heron II), 3 All E.R. 686 (H.L. 1967). In that case, the defendant carrier delivered sugar late. By the time the sugar arrived, intervening events,
including the arrival of another shipment of sugar, had caused the market price to fall
during the delay. This caused the buyer to suffer damages greater than would otherwise have occurred. The change in market conditions and the resulting losses to the
buyer were not at the time of the formation of the contract the probable consequence
of breach because it was just as likely that the market would rise or not change at all.
Nevertheless a drop in price would be a normal occurrence in the sugar market.
187. See supra note 94.

188. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
189. See supra part II.B.5.
190. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
191. The efficient acquisition of information is promoted by holding the seller responsible for all information the buyer has disclosed and all other information, including market conditions, that the seller reasonably should have known whether through
inquiry or otherwise.
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seller could reasonably have predicted under the appropriate standard
the amount of the buyer's loss, the seller should be liable for that loss,
even if the type of loss was unpredictable. This proposal would modify current law, which considers the likelihood of the type of loss to be
of crucial significance to the scope of the seller's liability for consequential economic damages' 92 but generally disregards the likelihood
of the extent of that lOSS. 1 9 3 By focusing on the amount of, rather than
the type of, loss predictability is promoted, as the seller can accurately
192. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 597 F. Supp.
1456, 1474-75 (E.D. Va. 1984) ("The language of the Restatement-focusing as it
does on the foreseeability of the loss rather than the foreseeability of the damagessupports the Court's interpretation that the Hadley foreseeability test is to be applied
to the kind, not the amount, of damage."); Swatek, Inc. v. North Star Graphics, Inc.,
587 A.2d 629, 632 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) ("Plaintiff need only demonstrate,
however, that the damage was of a type that a reasonable man would realize to be a
probable result of his breach.").
Even if courts do not expressly state that the "type" of the buyer's loss must be
foreseeable, they nevertheless typically analyze the issue of foreseeability in terms of
whether the seller had enough information to make foreseeable the type of injury that
was suffered by the buyer. For example, if the buyer suffered lost resale profits as a
result of the seller's breach, the court typically inquires into whether that type of loss
(i.e., lost resale profits) was foreseeable. See Taylor & Gaskin, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., 732 F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that buyer's recall of its boats
caused by seller's sale of defective gas tanks was foreseeable); Blue Circle AtI., Inc. v.
Falcon Materials, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 516, 523 (D. Md. 1991) (stating that it was not
foreseeable that defective product would cause loss of value to buyer's business when
business sold four years later); Anna Ready Mix, Inc. v. N.E. Pierson Constr. Co., 747
F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05 (S.D. Ill. 1990) (proclaiming that loss caused by buyer's being
deprived of performance bond in construction business was not foreseeable from information available to seller); Fortin v. Ox-Bow Marina, Inc., 557 N.E.2d 1157, 1165
(Mass. 1990) (holding that interest paid on purchase money loan is a recoverable type
of consequential loss); Harbor Hill Lithographing Corp. v. Dittler Bros., Inc., 348
N.Y.S.2d 920, 923-24 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding seller liable for loss because he could
foresee the existence of lost profits, despite the fact there was no evidence seller knew
the precise extent of contemplated profits); AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. Atl. Richfield
Co., 584 A.2d 915, 923 (Pa. 1990) (finding that inquiry into whether type of injury
characterized as "loss of secondary profits" was foreseeable); Cook Assocs., Inc. v.
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166-67 (Utah 1983) (finding that lost manufacturing profits
caused by seller's late delivery of parts was foreseeable).
193. Most authority addressing the issue has held that it is not a defense that the
seller could not foresee the amount of the loss. See, e.g., Harmon Cable Communications of Neb. Ltd. Partnership v. Scope Cable Television, Inc., 468 N.W.2d 350, 362
(Neb. 1991) (holding that seller's premise that amount of damages must be foreseeable was "fallacious"); Barnard v. Compugraphic Corp., 667 P.2d 117, 120 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1983) ("It is not necessary that the specific injury or amount of harm be foreseen, but only that a reasonable person.., would foresee that in the usual courge of
events, damages would follow from its breach."); Anderson, supra note 12, at 364
("[A]s a general proposition, there is no requirement that the seller have reason to
know of the potential magnitude of the buyer's loss."). Other authorities have held
that loss was foreseeable even if the amount of loss was not. See, e.g., Sun Maid
Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co., 194 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding defendant liable despite its assertion that the amount of plaintiff's lost profits
must be foreseeable); Harbor Hill Lithographing Corp. v. Dittler Bros., Inc., 348
N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (proclaiming that "resale circumstances put the
seller on notice of potential exposure to liability for lost resale profits").
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estimate its liability for consequential economic damages and take appropriate protective measures in response. The prospective type of
the buyer's loss should be, and under this proposal would be, relevant
only to the extent that it is indicative of the amount of the seller's
prospective liability.19 4

Emphasis on the type of the buyer's loss rather than on the amount
is not only misguided, but unjust. It denies all recovery to the buyer
who suffers an economic loss in an amount that is fully within the
reasonable expectation of the seller if that loss was of an unexpected
type. For example, the buyer who suffers a $10,000 loss by being de-

nied a profitable resale because of the seller's late delivery of industrial equipment is denied all recovery if the only type of loss the seller

reasonably expected to arise from breach was a temporary shutdown
of operations, irrespective of the fact that the seller reasonably expected the buyer to lose at least $10,000.
By shifting the focus to the amount of, rather than the type of, the
buyer's loss, the buyer who suffers loss in an amount equalling the
seller's reasonable expectations, as defined under the applicable standard, would be fully compensated,195 and the buyer who suffers loss in
an amount exceeding those reasonable expectations would merely be

denied recovery of the excess. 19 If, for example, the seller's liability
Some decisions implicitly adopt the premise that if the amount of loss is unpredictable the seller is relieved from liability. See e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Krebs
Eng'rs, 859 F.2d 501, 508 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that the plaintiff's unreasonably
large attorney's fees raise issue of foreseeability); Lenox, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Alarm,
738 F. Supp. 262, 268-69 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding seller of failed burglar alarm not
liable for theft of $125,000 of jewelry from buyer's car because dollar amount so unexpectedly large). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts implicitly adopts the same
premise, suggesting that a buyer's lost resale profit would be foreseeable and therefore recoverable if it were in a reasonable amount but not if it were in an extraordinarily large amount. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 cmt. b, illus. 3-7 (1979).
Even under the Restatement, however, it is not clear that the extent of the buyer's
loss is relevant. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 597 F. Supp.
1456, 1474-75 (E.D. Va. 1984) ("The language of the Restatement-focusing as it
does on the foreseeability of the loss rather than the foreseeability of the damagessupports the Court's interpretation that the Hadley foreseeability test is to be applied
to the kind, not the amount, of damage.").
194. The type of loss may be relevant in the sense that if the seller can reasonably
predict the type of the buyer's loss, the seller may use that information to predict the
amount or extent of loss more accurately. For example, if, based on the buyer's circumstances, the seller should have expected that its breach would result in a lost resale profit, this information would help the seller to estimate the amount of loss
caused by breach.
195. For example, if, based on the nature of the transaction, the seller should have
expected that late delivery of goods would cause a shutdown of the buyer's operation
resulting in damages of at least $10,000, then it would be irrelevant to the seller that
such amount of damages was caused instead by the buyer's loss of a resale contract
instead.
196. Among the few authorities that impliedly require the amount of loss to be
foreseeable, in cases where not all of the buyer's losses were foreseeable there is disagreement as to whether all recovery is barred or whether only that portion that is
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is governed by the intermediate standard, the buyer suffers loss of
$12,000, and loss in excess of $10,000 is abnormal, the buyer would be
allowed recovery for $10,000, but not for the remaining $2,000.
F.

The Effect of the Trifurcated Standard on Remote Buyers

Current law is divided as to whether the absence of privity of contract should be a bar to a remote buyer's recovery of consequential
damages for economic loss caused by the remote seller's breach. 97
unforeseeable is barred. Compare Lenox, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Alarm, 738 F. Supp.
262, 270 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (seller of failed burglar alarm not liable for any of buyer's
$125,000 theft loss) with Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 cmt. b, illus. 6
(1979) (seller is not liable for buyer's loss of profits to the extent that loss exceeded
what was foreseeable).
197. Although the privity doctrine may be in retreat on some fronts, courts have
divided on the question of whether privity is required when a buyer claims economic
loss resulting from a breach of an implied warranty.
Cases requiring privity for the recovery of economic loss arising from breach of
implied warranty include: Mt. Holly Ski Area v. U.S. Electrical Motors, 666 F. Supp.
115, 120 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (privity required for economic damages, not for personal
injury damages); Wellcraft Marine v. Zarzour, 577 So. 2d 414, 419 (Ala. 1990) (privity
required for recovery of economic damages, not personal injury damages); Flory v.
Silvercrest Indus., 633 P.2d 383, 387 (Ariz. 1981) (privity required for recovery of
economic damages); U.S. Roofing v. Credit Alliance Corp., 279 Cal. Rptr. 533, 538
(App. 3d 1991) ("Vertical privity is a prerequisite in California for recovery on a theory of breach of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability"); GAF Corp.
v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (privity required for economic losses); Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760,767 (Ill. 1986) (privity
required for economic damages); Prairie Prod., Inc. v. Agchem Div.-Pennwalt Corp.,
514 N.E.2d 1299, 1301-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "implied warranties, as
they relate to economic loss from the bargain, cannot ordinarily be sustained between
the buyer and a remote manufacturer); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp.,
436 N.E.2d 1322 (N.Y. 1982) (privity required for economic loss). In support of this
view, the Oregon Supreme Court stated the following:
But to allow a nonprivity warranty action to vindicate every disappointed
consumer would unduly complicate the code's scheme, which recognizes the
consensual elements of commerce. Disclaimers and limitations of certain
warranties and remedies are matters for bargaining. Strict-liability actions
between buyers and remote sellers could lend themselves to the proliferation of unprovable claims by disappointed bargain hunters, with little discernable social benefit. .

.

. Where the purchaser of an unmerchantable

product suffers only loss of profits, his remedy for the breach of warranty is
against his immediate seller unless he can predicate liability upon some fault
on the part of a remote seller.
State ex reL Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217-18 (Or. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
Cases holding that privity is not required for the recovery of economic damages
arising from breach of implied warranty include: Patty Precision Prods. Co. v. Brown
& Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1254 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Oklahoma law);
Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105, 110 (3rd Cir. 1985) (applying
New Jersey law); TCF Bank & Say. v. Marshall Truss Sys., 466 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663
(N.J. 1985); Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equip. Co., 595 A.2d 1198, 1201-02
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Spagnol Enters., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 568 A.2d 948, 952
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81
(Tex. 1977); Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 408 S.E.2d 270, 272 (W. Va. 1991); Sunnyslope
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Scholars have cogently argued that the absence of privity of contract

should not bar recovery. 198 To the extent privity of contract is not a
requirement for recovery, 199 a special application of the trifurcated
standard would govern the remote buyer's rights against the remote

seller. For purposes of this discussion, the remote seller will be referred to as the manufacturer and the immediate seller as the retailer.

The same policies that justify a trifurcated standard of liability when
the parties are in privity of contract apply when they are not. The
remote buyer that fails to disclose its special circumstances to the retailer should have the least recovery, and the manufacturer that has

committed a willfully inefficient breach should incur the broadest liaGrading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213 (Wis. 1989). The
Supreme Court of Texas supported this view as follows:
There is a split among both Texas courts and courts of other jurisdictions as
to whether privity should be abolished in implied warranty actions for economic loss.... Today, a consumer, without regard to privity, can recovery
against a manufacturer whose defective product causes the consumer to suffer the slightest physical injury. It would be inconsistent to demand privity as
a prerequisite to the same consumer's recovery against a manufacturer
whose defective product causes the consumer to lose his entire life savings.
Consequently, we hold that privity is not a requirement for a Uniform Commercial Code implied warranty action for economic loss.
Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977).
198. Professor Speidel has argued effectively based on exchange theory that the
privity defense should be abolished in economic loss cases. Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once More Into the Void,
67 B.U. L. Rev. 9 (1987). See also Norman Deutsch, Seller's Liability to Remote Purchasers and Nonpurchasersfor Physical and Economic Loss in Breach of Warranty
Actions in New York-- An Analysis of the Privity Defense and the Views of Professor
Speidel and the Article 2 Study Group, 54 Alb. L. Rev. 35, 86 (1989) (agreeing with
Professor Speidel's analysis and suggesting the abolition of the privity requirement in
all contexts); John E. Murray, Jr., Products Liability v. Warranty Claims: Untangling
the Web, 3. J. L. & Com. 269,274 (1983); Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and of Products Liability, 23 San Diego L
Rev. 37, 51-78 (1986).
199. There are two kinds of privity that might be required-"vertical" privity and
"horizontal" privity. The distinction is explained by Professors White and Summers:
There are two basic kinds of "non-privity" plaintiffs. The "vertical" non-privity plaintiff is a buyer within the distributive chain who did not buy directly
from the defendant. For example, a man who buys a lathe from a local hardware store and then later sues the manufacturer is a "vertical" non-privity
plaintiff. The "horizontal" non-privity plaintiff is not a buyer within the distributive chain but one who consumes or uses or is affected by the goods. For
example, a woman poisoned by a bottle of beer that her husband purchased
from a local grocer is a horizontal non-privity plaintiff. So, too, is a son who
is injured by the new lawnmower his father bought, and the employee hurt
by equipment purchased by her employer, and so on.
White & Summers, supra note 30, at 456. See also Devience, supra note 56, at 306.
The accompanying textual discussion deals only with the effect on the trifurcated
standard if the requirement of vertical privity were abolished for commercial or economic loss. No opinion is expressed with regard to how the proposed trifurcated system would operate if the requirement of horizontal privity were abolished.
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bility. In all other cases, the remote buyer's rights against the manufacturer should be governed by the intermediate standard.c °
The probability standard would apply in the remote buyer's action
against the breaching manufacturer when the remote buyer did not
disclose its special circumstances to the retailer. It can be argued that
the probability standard should not apply to the manufacturer despite
the buyer's nondisclosure to the retailer because the manufacturer executed its contract and delivered the goods to the retailer prior to the
buyer's nondisclosure. Therefore, the manufacturer would have had
no opportunity to take additional protective measures even if the
buyer had disclosed its special circumstances to the retailer. If the
probability standard did not apply, however, the buyer would have no
incentive to disclose its special circumstances to the retailer because it
would be entitled to more expansive recovery against the manufacturer under the intermediate standard. Therefore, to encourage the
disclosure of such information to the retailer, it is essential to limit the
nondisclosing buyer's recovery against the manufacturer.0 1
The significant possibility standard would apply in favor of the remote buyer when the manufacturer commits a willfully inefficient
breach of its contract with the retailer. It should be irrelevant whether
the seller knew that the breach would likely be inefficient with regard
to the remote buyer. The deterrent effect of the significant possibility
standard would be substantially and unnecessarily diminished if proof
were required to show that the manufacturer's breach was willfully
inefficient with regard to remote buyers. For this standard to apply, it
should be enough that the manufacturer engaged in a reprehensible,
economically unjustifiable breach of its contract with the retailer.
G. Applying the Trifurcated Standard to Hadley
Hadley involved the buyers' nondisclosure of their special circumstances; it therefore would have been governed by the probability
standard. The millers in Hadley never informed the carrier that the
mill would be shut down until the shaft was returned; hence they
failed to disclose their special circumstances. °2 The disclosure of that
information might reasonably have induced the carrier to take additional protective measures in response. As the court noted, "[H]ad
200. The determination of whether the buyer's losses were a probable, significantly

possible or normal consequence of breach should be made at the time of the formation of the manufacturer's contract with the retailer.
201. The determination of whether the remote buyer's losses were a probable result

of breach would require showing that the seller should have known either that, in the
event of breach, this particular buyer would probably suffer those losses or that each

of retailer's buyers would probably suffer those losses. If probability were measured
from a global perspective by the cumulative likelihood that such a loss would occur
once among all of the seller's remote buyers, the probability standard would be meaningless. See supra note 141.
202. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the
damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to
deprive them.""2 3 Under the probability standard, the millers would
be denied recovery for their lost profits caused by the shutdown of the
mill because the carrier should not have known that such losses would
result as a probable consequence of breach.
If the millers had disclosed their special circumstances, the more
lenient intermediate standard would apply and they would be entitled
to recover all lost profits that, at the time of the formation of the contract, the carrier should have known would be a normal result of the
Because there is no indication of changed circumstances
shutdown.'
subsequent to the formation of the contract, the millers would be entitled to full recovery under the intermediate standard.') Even if the
circumstances had changed, the millers would still be entitled to full
recovery unless those changes caused the millers to suffer abnormally
large losses.'
In the absence of the millers' disclosure of their special circumstances, it would be difficult to prove that the carrier's breach was
willfully inefficient.2 ' 7 For example, if the carrier intentionally
delayed delivery to reduce its expenses by shipping the crankshaft in
bulk with other merchandise,' it would be difficult for the millers to
prove that the carrier should have known that the carrier's cost savings through bulk delivery were likely to be exceeded by the millers'
losses caused by the delay. Even with nondisclosure, however, the
carrier's breach might have been willfully inefficient if, for example,
203. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 355, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
204. Hadley may have intended to create a bifurcated system of liability consistent

with the probability and intermediate standards proposed herein. In cases where special circumstances "were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants" the court
states that damages would be the amount of injury that would "ordinarily follow" as a
result of breach. But in cases where such special circumstances have not been disclosed, the court states that damages should be limited to those that arise in "the great
multitude of cases." Whether such a distinction was intended depends on whether the
court meant the phrase "great multitude of cases" to be more restrictive than the
phrase "ordinarily follow."

There is some case authority supporting the possibility of a bifurcated standard of
liability depending on whether the buyer has disclosed special circumstances.
Cencula v. Keller, 536 N.E.2d 93, 95-96 (IM.App. Ct. 1989); Long Island Lighting Co.

v. City of Glen Cove, 315 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658-59 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 183-86.
206. See supra text accompanying note 185.
207. The buyer has an incentive to disclose its special circumstances because, to the
extent that all costs of breach are disclosed to the seller, the buyer can more easily
invoke the significant possibility standard by proving that the seller knew that its
breach would be inefficient.
208. There is some indication that the carrier delayed delivery while awaiting a full
shipload of items to ship. Such a knowing delay would involve an inquiry as to
whether the carrier reasonably thought its breach would be efficient. See Danzig,
supra note 39, at 251 & n.5.
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the carrier breached simply because of a personal conflict with the
millers. Under this scenario, the carrier would be liable for the losses
which at the time of breach it should have known were significantly
possible. The Hadley court acknowledged that a shutdown was one of
at least three possible consequences of late delivery, implicitly conceding that its occurrence was a significant possibility. Therefore, despite
the millers' nondisclosure, they would be entitled to recover as damages all lost profits from the shutdown that were not so extraordinary
as to be extremely unusual.
CONCLUSION

By adjusting the level of liability according to the policy concerns
presented, the trifurcated standard will promote, fairly and efficiently,
the relevant underlying policies of contract law to an extent not
achievable under the unitary, inflexible standard of Hadley v. Baxendale. The authors have sought to explain why different situations
demand variant standards of recovery. The proposed trifurcated standard is not the only model that could achieve that result. For example, it might be possible to have a continuum of liability-a sliding
scale with no precise demarcations-expanding recovery in response
to the seller's fault and limiting recovery in response to the buyer's
fault. Such a sliding scale has the value of avoiding the precise fact
finding that the trifurcated standard demands. But a sliding scale also
leaves sellers and buyers without clear guidance as to the consequences of their actions and leaves the courts without clear guidance
as to how to resolve a particular case. Regardless of the approach ultimately taken, the authors hope that this Article will stimulate discussion about the standard for the recovery of consequential damages for
economic loss and direct that discussion toward a new, more flexible
perspective.

